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our sister Circuits," is far from lucid. Substantial confusion exists
regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a "designated
public forum" and a "limited public forum."'
I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty-five years after the United States Supreme Court, in
Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,2 purported to define
and elucidate the components of its "public forum" doctrine, the meaning-
and legal significance-of the "limited public forum" concept remains star-
tlingly unclear. Confessions of uncertainty by courts as to the meaning of
this term-and its relationship to its doctrinal siblings, the "designated" pub-
lic forum and the "non-public forum"-are, in fact, surprisingly common in
reported judicial decisions.3 At the same time, the body of rules created by
the Supreme Court governing access by citizens to governmentally con-
trolled properties and channels of communication for the purpose of expres-
sion has been subjected to much criticism, usually and primarily on the
ground that these rules, in their entirety, are unduly restrictive of freedom of
expression. 4 Often such criticism has been accompanied by thoughtful sug-
1. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006). The court's definition of a
designated public forum is itself reflective of the confusion of which the court speaks.
2. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006);
Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Although the Supreme
Court and the circuits have clarified the functional difference between the designated and
limited forums, the precise taxonomic designation of the latter remains elusive."); Goulart v.
Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2003); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074
(9th Cir. 2001) ("The designated public forum has been the source of much confusion....
'The contours of the terms "designated public forum" and "limited public forum" have not
always been clear."') (quoting Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d
958, 965 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999)); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914 (10th Cir. 1997).
4. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 993-97 (Foundation
Press 2d ed., 1988); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REv. 949, 949 (1992); David S. Day, The Public Forum Doctrine's "Government
Intent Standard": What Happened to Justice Kennedy?, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REv 173, 174
(2000); David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REv. 143, 145
(1992) [hereinafter Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine]; C. Thomas Dienes, Com-
ment, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 109, 109-22 (1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70
VA. L. REv. 1219, 1223-25 (1984); Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, "What's in a Name?": An
Attempt to Resolve the "Analytic Ambiguity" of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107
DICK L. REv. 639, 640-42 (2003); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Side-
walks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1565 (1998); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neu-
tral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309-10 (1999); Matthew
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gestions of alternative approaches that would be more protective of speech.5
But, to paraphrase Marc Antony,6 I come to decipher the "public forum"
doctrine, not to denigrate it.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that the "public forum" doc-
trine is too speech-restrictive, but rather to simply try to make a contribution
toward clarifying the meaning of the mysterious and perplexing "limited
public forum." I do criticize the Court, however, for allowing the confusion
surrounding this concept to fester and persist. And, in trying to make sense
of what the Supreme Court has said and done with respect to this concept,
and thus to arrive at a workable understanding thereof, I will briefly consider
whether any such understanding makes sense within the larger context of
facilitating freedom of expression. But my focus will remain primarily a
pragmatic one, accepting the broad outlines of what the Supreme Court has
done, under the heading of the "public forum" doctrine, with the relatively
modest goal of trying to eliminate (or at least minimize) needless confusion
in the application of these rules.
The importance of this legal doctrine can hardly be doubted. It is com-
monplace for citizens to seek to engage in communicative activities on (or
via) governmentally controlled properties (or channels of communication)
other than those that have traditionally been available for expression, and
case law reflects that they have done so with regard to a wide variety of such
"non-traditional fora"-ranging from government office waiting rooms,7 to
college campus lawns,8 to national cemeteries,9 to name just a few examples.
In each such instance, when the government actor in charge of the forum
D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional
Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REv. 929, 938-42 (2000); Edward J. Neveril, Comment, "Objective"
Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architec-
tural Chicanery, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1185, 1186-87 (1996); Robert C. Post, Between Gover-
nance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1713, 1745 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the
Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 343 (1986). Less critical views of the public
forum doctrine are offered in Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In
Defense of Categories, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 80-81 (1992), and Richard B. Saphire, Recon-
sidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 741 (1991). See also Frederick
Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84,
84-86 (1998).
5. Farber & Nowak, supra note 4, at 1239-45; Fischer, supra note 4, at 670-73; Gey,
supra note 4, at 1566-76; Post, supra note 4, at 1765-84; Massey, supra note 4, at 334-51;
McGill, supra note 4, at 953-57.
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JuLIus CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2.
7. E.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2004).
8. E.g., Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 467 (7th Cir. 2007).
9. E.g., Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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denies access, and the speaker cares enough to bring suit, a decision must be
made, under governing legal principles, as to the nature of the forum: Is it
"closed," so that access may presumptively be denied, or has it been
"opened," so that access must presumptively be granted? The government
actor may place the forum "off limits" to expressive activity, in which case
the property (or channel) in question will be deemed a "non-public forum."'
If, on the other hand, the government actor has opened, for expressive activi-
ty, a property (or channel) that need not have been so opened, we then have a
"forum by designation" or "designated public forum." The government actor
is not completely free, even in the non-public forum, to deny access for ex-
pressive activity, but the level of judicial review that will be employed in
such cases is relatively low and deferential to the government, at least in
theory. In the designated public forum, on the other hand, a more rigorous
level of judicial review is (theoretically) employed. So the label matters.
The "mystery" of my title is really twofold, as reflected in the two ma-
jor questions to be pursued in this Article: First, how does the concept of the
"limited public forum" fit into this scheme? To put it another way, what is
the legal significance of that label? Second, how do we know when we have
a limited public forum, as opposed to a non-public forum? To put that ques-
tion another way, what criteria (if any) may dependably guide us in deciding
whether a limited public forum has been created? A subsidiary question
here, of potential significance, is: How do we decide for whom such a forum
has been opened?
Part II of this Article will explain how pertinent United States Supreme
Court opinions have given rise to, and perpetuated, the mystery of the limited
public forum, and extract the clues the Court has provided to the solution of
this mystery. Part IH will summarize the treatment of the limited public fo-
rum concept by federal appellate courts in recent years, highlighting the ex-
tent to which some of those courts have been misled by what the United
States Supreme Court has said and done. Finally, Part IV will consider the
workability of an approach guided by what appears to be the proper under-
standing of the United States Supreme Court's collective teachings concern-
ing the limited public forum.
10. Because we are dealing, by definition, with public-and not private-property, the
term is something of a misnomer. It would be more accurate to speak, in such a case, of a
"public non-forum," but we appear to be stuck, at this point, with "non-public forum."
[Vol. 33
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II. AMBIGUITY AND LACK OF CLARITY AT THE SUPREME COURT LEVEL
A. The Early Cases: Decisions Without Rules
The history of the public forum doctrine at the United States Supreme
Court level-and the philosophical underpinnings thereof-have been
described quite satisfactorily elsewhere." Suffice to say, here, that a theme
that made its first appearance in a United States Supreme Court opinion in
1966, namely that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated,"' 2 soon led to fairly clear implications that limitations on
expressive activity in a governmentally controlled property that was not a
"4public forum" would be subjected to a significantly lower level of judicial
scrutiny than would otherwise be the case. 13  No explicit statement was
made, in the cases of the 1970s, regarding the level of scrutiny to be
employed in such a case, but clearly the Court, once it declared that a
government property was not a "public forum," was not going to adhere to
the emerging rule that discrimination against speech on the basis of content
would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 14 Conversely, the Court was
quite hospitable to the claims of speakers in settings which were
characterized as "open"'5 or "public" fora. 16 Not until 1983, in the Perry
decision, did the Court attempt to impose structure and clarity upon this body
of case law involving access by speakers to non-traditional governmentally
controlled fora.17
11. See Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, supra note 4, at 147-59; BeVier,
supra note 4, at 82-100; Dienes, supra note 4, at 111-17; Post, supra note 4, at 1718-58;
Werhan, supra note 4, at 343-404.
12. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47 (1966).
13. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128-32
(1981); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536, 540
(1980).
15. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 175 (1976). Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), differed in that the forum at
issue was described as "limited," and "generally open [for use by] student groups." Id. at 272,
277.
16. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
17. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
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B. The Trouble with Perry18
Justice White's majority opinion in Perry represented a major step for-
ward doctrinally, but nonetheless fell well short of achieving optimum clarity
in its explication of governing rules. Justice White set forth, in this opinion,
the tripartite breakdown of governmental "fora" in language that continues to
be quoted regularly.' 9 The first category, he stated, consists of "places which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate," embracing (at least) "streets and parks."2 "In these quintessential
public forums," he went on to say, restrictions on expression would be eva-
luated pursuant to the tests usually employed to gauge the constitutionality of
content-based or content-neutral regulations of speech. 21 "A second catego-
ry," he continued, "consists of public property which the State has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. 22 (Immediately a
clear, if ultimately insignificant, semantic contradiction arose: How can a
place devoted to expression "by government fiat"--ostensibly in the first
category of forum-not fall into this second category?)23 This second cate-
gory is important because, Justice White instructed us, the First Amendment
"forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to
the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place."24
At this point a key point was made in a footnote: "[a] public forum may be
created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups... or for the dis-
cussion of certain subjects., 25 A significant caveat was added: "[a]lthough a
State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as
long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum ' 26 (thus introducing the term "traditional public forum" to de-
scribe the first category in this taxonomy).
Finally, he addressed the third category, described simply as "[p]ublic
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication. 27 In such locations, it was revealed for the very first time,
18. Other critical evaluations of Perry have been offered by Farber & Nowak, supra note
4, at 1255-57; Gey, supra note 4, at 1548-50, 1578-80; Post, supra note 4, at 1750-56.
19. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-46.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The terminology has been criticized by Professor Post as well. Post, supra note 4, at
1758 ("The reference to 'government fiat' is ill-considered.").
24. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
25. Id. at 46 n.7.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Id.
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"the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view., 28 Oddly, it was not until later in his opinion that Justice
White gave this third type of governmental property a name, and he did so
only in passing, while adding important content to its definition: "[i]mplicit
in the concept of the non-public forum," he wrote, "is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. 2 9
Distinctions of this kind, he continued, "are inherent and inescapable in the
process of limiting a non-public forum to activities compatible with the
intended purpose of the property. 3 °
Thus, the following important precepts had now been established: First,
that streets and parks (and later, sidewalks) 3' were "traditional" public fora,
subject to the usual principles of First Amendment analysis; 32 second, that
government actors might, as a matter of discretion, create "designated" pub-
lic fora, which would be subject to those same First Amendment rules, at
least as long as they retained their status as fora opened for expressive activi-
ties; and third, that even with respect to those governmentally owned proper-
ties which the government was entitled to make "off limits" for expressive
activity, there were limits on the government's power to do SO. 33 The last
proposition was surely the most surprising, and the most welcome from the
28. Id.
29. Perry, 450 U.S. at 49.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
32. The "traditional public forum" category may be a "closed" class, in the sense that
only streets, sidewalks, and parks-the kinds of government property which, generally, have
been available for expressive activity-can fall within the category. As Justice Kennedy
stated in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998),
"[t]he Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its his-
toric confines," citing International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON),
505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992). It is thus the least troublesome of the "forum" categories, yet
questions do arise as to its application to unconventional sidewalks. See United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 497 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80. Lower courts have extended the category so as to
encompass arguably comparable governmental properties. See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of
Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (publicly-owned pedestrian mall); Pouillon v.
City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 717 (6th Cir. 2000) (city hall steps); Warren v. Fairfax County,
196 F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1999) (outdoor area in front of county government center). The
United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case raising the question of
whether a particular municipal park is a traditional public forum. Summum v. Pleasant Grove
City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 31, 2008). See
generally Neveril, supra note 4. See also Saphire, supra note 4, at 745-50.
33. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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standpoint of maximizing freedom of speech; no prior United States Su-
preme Court decision had spoken of, much less relied upon, the concept of
viewpoint discrimination, which was now declared to be intolerable even in a
"non-public forum., 34 And while earlier "non-public forum" decisions at the
United States Supreme Court level had typically offered ad hoc justifications
for the exclusions at issue,35 it was now clear, for the first time, that some
level of justification-satisfying a test of "reasonableness"36-was in fact
required.37 In all of these respects, the opinion in Perry was quite helpful.
But with respect to the concept of the "limited" public forum, the opi-
nion was distinctly unhelpful. First, as with the term "non-public forum,"
Justice White used the term "limited public forum" only in passing, never
defining it despite the fact that this opinion was the occasion for his grand
elaboration of the three-part "forum" categorization scheme; readers of the
opinion were thus left to infer that the "limited" public forum was the afore-
mentioned forum "created for a limited purpose such as use by certain
groups ... or for the discussion of certain subjects. 38
Second, and most inexcusably, the legal significance of the label was
never made explicit in Justice White's opinion. He stated that the designated
public forum would be treated as if it were a traditional public forum, but
said nothing, in general terms, as to how the constitutionality of an exclusion
of a particular speaker from a designated public forum limited for "use by
certain groups" would be assessed. He did, however, provide some pretty
good clues to the solution of this mystery. The most helpful clue emerged
from his response to the argument made by the excluded teachers' union,
Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA), that the mailbox system had
"become a 'limited public forum' from which it may not be excluded be-
cause of the periodic use of the system by private non-school connected
34. See id. at 46. The dissenters in Perry, of course, believed that the school district's
exclusion of the rival teachers' union from the interschool mail system did indeed amount to
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But the majority disagreed. Id.
at 49 n.9 (majority opinion).
35. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 133-34 (1977); Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
302-03 (1974).
36. While this requirement of "reasonableness" has at times been lightly equated with the
familiar "rational basis" level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 4, at 117; Massey,
supra note 4, at 313, lower court decisions appear to refute this unsupported conclusion. See
infra note 276 and accompanying text. See also ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding a ban on leafletting in a non-public forum unreasonable, and maintaining
that "we have required some explanation as to why certain speech is inconsistent with the
intended use of the forum.").
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
38. Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 33
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groups. 39  PLEA's core grievance, of course, was that its access to the
school mail system was terminated subsequent to the certification of its rival,
Perry Education Association (PEA), as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for the teachers in the school district; PEA, of course retained access to
the mailboxes.4 But, in addition, the school district did "allow some outside
organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other civic and church
organizations to use the facilities."'" Had the mail system thus become a
limited public forum, as PLEA contended? No, replied Justice White, add-
ing: "This type of selective access does not transform government property
into a public forum. '42 He went on to add the following paragraph, which is
the major clue to which I have referred:
Moreover, even if we assume that by granting access to the
Cub Scouts, YMCA's, and parochial schools, the [sichool [d]istrict
has created a "limited" public forum, the constitutional right of
access would in any event extend only to other entities of similar
character. While the school mail facilities thus might be a forum
generally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club and
other organizations that engage in activities of interest and educa-
tional relevance to students, they would not as a consequence be
open to an organization such as PLEA, which is concerned with
the terms and conditions of teacher employment.43
The implications of this dictum seem clear: In a limited public forum,
we must first identify the speakers to whom the forum has been opened-the
favored class of speakers, if you will-and then ask whether the speaker who
seeks access to the forum-the challenger-is an "entit[y] of similar charac-
ter" to those to whom the forum has been opened.44 In other words, we must
ask whether the challenger falls within the favored class of speakers. If the
answer is "yes," then that challenger enjoys a "right of access" to the forum.
To put it another way, a limited public forum would be "open" to speakers
who fall into the same class as those to whom the forum has already been
opened. But as to a speaker who does not fall into the favored class, what
then? The answer to this question would appear to be provided by the way
the Court treated PLEA's attempt to gain access to the school mail system:
Justice White asserted that "the school mail system" (vis-a-vis PLEA, in any
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 40-41.
41. ld. at47.
42. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
43. Id. at 48.
44. See id.
9
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event) was "not a public forum," and fell within the "third category" (later
equated, implicitly, with the term "non-public forum") of the new taxono-
my.45 So it would appear, from the totality of the Perry decision, that a li-
mited public forum will be treated as either a traditional public forum or a
non-public forum, depending on whether the challenger does or does not fall
within the favored class of speakers. 46
The other clue, in Perry, that supports this conclusion-and, in particu-
lar, the conclusion that a limited public forum will be treated as a traditional
public forum if the challenger falls within the favored class of speakers-is
the citation of Widmar v. Vincent7 as an example of a public forum "created
for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups. 48 Widmar, of course,
involved a state university that "routinely provide[d] University facilities for
the meetings of registered [student] organizations, 4 but subsequently de-
cided that it would violate the Establishment Clause if it were to continue to
make those facilities available to a religious student organization.' The stu-
dent organization sued, and prevailed.5 1 Justice Powell's pre-Perry reason-
ing regarding the public forum issue, on behalf of the Court's majority, was
as follows:
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the Uni-
versity has created a forum generally open for use by student
groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation
to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable con-
stitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce cer-
tain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if
it was not required to create the forum in the first place....
* * * With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases
leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and as-
sociation extend to the campuses of state universities.
Here [the University of Missouri] has discriminated against
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a general-
ly open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion....
In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the
45. Id. at 46, 48.
46. This understanding is essentially shared by Professor Buchanan and Professor Wer-
han. See Buchanan, supra note 4, at 960, 965; Werhan, supra note 4, at 406 n.346; see also
Fischer, supra note 4, at 671-72; McGill, supra note 4, at 942.
47. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
48. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
49. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
50. Id. at 265 & n.3.
51. Id. at 267.
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University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropri-
ate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrow-
ly drawn to achieve that end.52
Again, Widmar was cited in Perry, as an example of a case involving a
limited public forum (despite the incongruous reference by Justice Powell
here, to "a forum generally open to the public"); the university facilities were
made available, for expressive purposes, only for student organizations.53
The excluded speaker was a student organization. 4 The Court in Widmar
appears to have decided that the excluded speaker fell into the class of
speakers to whom the forum had been opened.55 That finding, along with the
recognition that the exclusion was based on the content of the speech in
question, led to the application of strict scrutiny-exactly as it would have
had the restriction been applied in a traditional public forum.56 If, on the
other hand, a non-student organization (the local chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union, for example) had sought access to the university's
facilities and been rebuffed, those same university facilities would
presumably have been treated as a non-public forum with respect to this
speaker that did not fall within the favored class.
Assuming that I am correct about Perry's implicit instructions
concerning restrictions on speech within a limited public forum, another
perplexing question arises: Why was not the teachers' mailbox system in
Perry deemed to be a limited public forum? By saying that the mail system
fell "within this third category" (non-public forum) and that it was "not a
public forum,' 57 Justice White pretty clearly declined to deem it a limited
public forum. But why was not it, given the fact that it appeared to have
been opened to some, but not all speakers? Granted, calling it a limited
public forum would presumably not have changed the result in this case
(since Justice White regarded the forum as closed to the challenger), but the
question remains important for the sake of understanding, generally, when
we have a limited public forum (thereby necessitating the subsidiary inquiry
as to whether the challenger is within the favored class of speakers) and
when we have a non-public forum (in which case no such inquiry is
required).
52. Id. at 267-70 (citations and footnotes omitted).
53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263).
54. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.2.
55. See id. at 269-70.
56. Id.
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 48.
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The same question may be asked with regard to the earlier United States
Supreme Court decisions which were predicated on the absence of "public
forum" status, all of which involved fora that had been opened to some
speakers, but not to the challengers: Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights58 (in
which the transit system "car cards" were available to most advertisements,
but not to political campaign ads); 59 Greer v. Spock ° (in which some
speakers and entertainers, but not political speakers, had been given access to
the military base);6 and, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc. 62 (in which some speakers had been allowed to address the prisoners, but
the prisoners' union could not).63 When no speaker has been given access to
the forum (as in Adderley v. Florida)6' the non-public forum label is easily
applied. But, when is a property properly deemed to be a non-public forum
when it has been opened to some (but not all) speakers? Lehman, Greer, and
Jones can be rationally viewed, in retrospect, as examples of limited public
fora, along with Widmar, yet Justice White cited Greer and Lehman, in Perry
in support of his pointed assertion that "selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum."65 Moreover, as noted earlier,
Justice White also stated that "[i]mplicit in the concept of the non-public
forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity." 6 But, why is a forum in which such subject-
matter distinctions have been made not a limited public forum? What
distinguishes Widmar, the quintessential limited public forum case, from
these others?
Justice White sheds little light in Perry on this key question, as he spent
most of his time (regarding the classification of the forum) making the
obvious point that the school mail system was "not held open to the general
public. '67 Even after having said that, and while purporting to explain why
the mailboxes did not amount to a "limited public forum," he simply
reiterated that "there is no indication in the record that the school mailboxes
and interschool delivery system are open for use by the general public."68
58. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
59. Id. at 304.
60. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
61. Id. at 838 n.10.
62. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
63. Id. at 121, 134.
64. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
65. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
66. ld. at 49.
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id.
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No, of course there was not, but, again, why was not the system a limited
public forum? In this regard, his next sentence may have had more
significance than was apparent at the time: "Permission to use the system to
communicate with teachers must be secured from the individual building
principal., 69 (We will return to that point later on.)70 It was at that point that
he made his statement that "selective access does not transform government
property into a public forum" '71 (even a limited public forum, apparently)
which was followed by his suggestion that, even if it were a limited public
forum, that would create a right of access "only to other entities of similar
character. 7
2
The mysterious matter of when we have a limited public forum is
perhaps all the more significant when one considers how rarely one is likely
to encounter a designated public forum that is not limited-i.e., "public
property which the [S]tate has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity. ' 73 The reader will no doubt recognize this language as
the description of Justice White's second category of forum, a description
which was followed by three citations: Widmar, City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Commission,74
and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.75 In fact, none of those cases
involved a forum that was opened to the general public for expressive
activity on an unlimited basis. Indeed, Widmar and City of Madison are the
cases which Justice White cited in the footnote in which he added that a
public forum might be created on a limited basis, either for use "by certain
groups" (citing Widmar) "or for the discussion of certain subjects" (citing
City of Madison, which involved speech at school board meetings, limited to
"school board business").76  As for Conrad, it involved access to a
municipally owned theater, which, by its very nature, certainly could not
have been opened to all speech by all speakers.77 So, Perry left careful
students of First Amendment law wondering, not only when a limited public
forum might have been created, but when the entire category of designated
public fora might be encountered as well.78
69. Id.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
71. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
74. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
75. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
77. See Conrad, 420 U.S. at 546.
78. A case which Justice White did not cite, but might have, as presenting an example of
a designated public forum not limited by subject matter or speaker identity is Heffron v. Int'l
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A final point with regard to Perry speaks to another perplexing aspect
of the limited public forum inquiry: If the Court had deemed the school mail
system to be a limited public forum, and if that meant (as it would appear to)
that the system would thus be open to "entities of a similar character" to
those speakers presently granted access thereto, why would PLEA, the rival
teachers' union, not be an "entity of a similar character?" Could it not be
credibly argued that the system had been opened to teachers' unions, of
which PLEA was one? (Indeed, it had previously been opened to both
teachers' unions.)79 Pretty clearly, the majority viewed the mail system as
being open not to teachers' unions generally, but only to the union that had
been certified as "the exclusive bargaining representative" of the local
teachers (along with the Cub Scouts and others, of course).80 That is not an
irrational conclusion by any means, but it does serve to illustrate the
inescapable corollary that, even if a limited public forum has been created,
the fate of the challenger will depend upon how the court characterizes the
class of speakers to whom the forum has been opened. In Widmar, by way
of contrast, the Court appeared to view the forum as having been opened to
student organizations, which included the religious challenger. 8' Why, it
may sensibly be asked, did the Court not view the forum as opened only to
non-religious student organizations, in which case the challenger would not
have fallen within the favored class of speakers?82
C. The Ambiguity of Cornelius
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund, Inc.,83 written in 1985, is notable primarily for its
elaboration upon Perry's minimal pronouncements regarding the designated-
public-forum concept.84 It was another case, like Perry, in which the Court
might have found that a limited public forum had been created, but instead
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981), in which Justice White
himself wrote the majority opinion upholding a time, place, and manner regulation applicable
to a state fairgrounds-a forum which presumably need not have been opened for expression,
but was.
79. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 48..
80. Id. at 55.
81. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
82. For a nuanced analysis of Widmar, see Post, supra note 4, at 1749.
83. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Although the majority in this case consisted of only four Jus-
tices, with three Justices dissenting and two not participating, the O'Connor opinion is consis-
tently treated as the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 826 (9th
Cir. 2007); Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2005).
84. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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deemed the intangible "forum" ("a charity drive aimed at federal em-
ployees")85 to be a non-public forum. 86 The oft-quoted general explanation
offered by Justice O'Connor included the following language:
In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be
created by government designation of a place or channel of com-
munication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech,
for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain sub-
jects....
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening
a nontraditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the
Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum. The Court has al-
so examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity to discern.the government's intent....
... We will not find that a public forum has been created in
the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent.. . nor will we infer
that the government intended to create a public forum when the na-
ture of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity .... In
cases where the principal function of the property would be dis-
rupted by expressive activity, the Court is particularly reluctant to
hold that the government intended to designate a public forum.
87
The key consideration, it is now clear, is the intention of the relevant gov-
ernment actor. But how is a court to determine whether that government
actor (a) intended to create a public forum open to a limited class of speak-
ers, on the one hand, or (b) intended to maintain a closed, "non-public" fo-
rum, even while "permitting limited discourse," on the other? The very fact
that a speaker has been excluded from the forum may be seen as evidence of
intent not to create a public forum, and the government actor can be ex-
pected, in any conflict that leads to litigation, to take the position that it had
no intention of opening a public forum. If the fact that some speech has been
permitted in the forum does not necessarily count against the government,
what will? Citations to prior decisions were sprinkled throughout
O'Connor's discussion, with cases like Widmar offered as examples of situa-
tions in which the government actor did have the intent to create a public
85. Id. at 790.
86. Id. at 806.
87. Id. at 802-04 (citations omitted).
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forum,"8 and cases like Lehman offered as examples of cases in which the
government actor did not have such intent.89 But did any of that suffice to
provide the necessary guidance?
As to "the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity,'"90 furthermore, could that possibly point toward a finding of intent
to create an open forum? A finding of incompatibility would understandably
support the conclusion that the government actor did not intend to create a
public forum (as in Adderley and Greer, the cases cited in support of that
proposition by O'Connor),9' but why would the fact that the challenger's
speech is compatible with the nature of the forum tell us anything about the
intentions of the relevant government actor? And what exactly is meant by
this notion of "compatibility?" Was Lehman's political campaign advertise-
ment incompatible with the "car cards" to which he was denied access?
Were PLEA's mailings incompatible with the school mailbox system in Per-
ry? Would it have been incompatible with the Combined Federal Campaign
(the charity drive in Cornelius) to have included the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund? The answers to these questions, unless we are to
understand "compatibility" to mean the absence of any persuasive reason for
excluding the speaker from the forum, would appear to be "no." Yet the
arguable compatibility of speaker and forum appeared to count for nothing in
each of these cases.
Cornelius is also notable because of the powerful dissenting opinion of
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, that the decision inspired.
Blackmun issued a fundamental critique of the Court's public forum doc-
trine, but, for the purposes of those of us who seek merely to understand, and
not to criticize, the most striking aspect of Blackmun's opinion is his ulti-
mate description of how, in his view, the doctrine works:
The Court's analysis empties the limited public forum concept
of meaning and collapses the three categories of public forum, li-
mited public forum, and non-public forum into two. The Court
makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a
particular class of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Gov-
ernment does not create a limited public forum unless it intends to
provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the exclu-
sion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not in-
tend to create such a forum no speaker challenging denial of access
88. Id. at 802.
89. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-04.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id. at 804.
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will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public forum.
The very fact that the Government denied access to the speaker in-
dicates that the Government did not intend to provide an open fo-
rum for expressive activity, and under the Court's analysis that fact
alone would demonstrate that the forum is not a limited public fo-
rum.
92
Was he correct in this assessment of the state of affairs to which the Court's
public-forum jurisprudence had led? Or was he missing something-and, if
so, what? Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, in her majority opinion, said not a
word about Blackmun's dissent-no "Justice Blackmun overlooks" or "Jus-
tice Blackmun misunderstands." Why? Why not reassure her readers that all
is not as bleak as the dissenters suggest? Why not explain, to Justice Black-
mun and the rest of us, that it really is still possible for a court to properly
conclude that a government actor intended to create a limited public forum,
and suggest how such a conclusion might be reached? One can only wonder
how she, and the Justices who joined her in the majority, reacted to Black-
mun's assertions. Did they simply feel that the majority opinion was clear
enough, and that Blackmun's view of the matter was misguided?93  Or did
they perhaps believe, in their heart of hearts, that, as a practical matter, he
probably had it right, and that limited public fora were, like other endangered
species, theoretically extant but not likely to be seen very often?
92. Id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Seven years later, in the
ISKCON decision, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter, quickly echoed Blackmun's concerns, in a single sentence regarding "the
so-called 'designated' forum. The requirements for such a designation," he wrote, "are so
stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at all." Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 697 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Consider also the words of Professor Post, commenting on Cornelius:
[T]he focus on intent had the virtue of candor, for it tactfully withdrew the concept of the li-
mited public forum as a meaningful category of constitutional analysis....
Cornelius shrinks the limited public forum to such insignificance that it is difficult to im-
agine how a plaintiff could ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a fo-
rum. If the reach of the forum is determined by the intent of the government, and if the exclu-
sion of the plaintiff is the best evidence of that intent, then the plaintiff loses in every case.
Post, supra note 4, at 1756-57 (footnote omitted); see also Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial
Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581, 615 n.230 (2006) (characterizing the limited public forum as "a
doctrinally incoherent concept").
93. Professor Post's critique of Cornelius, quoted in part at supra note 92, continued:
There is only one way out of this vicious circle, and it is not very satisfactory. It would require
the Court to distinguish between the intent to include the class of speakers or subjects of which
the plaintiff is the representative, and the intent to exclude the plaintiff. One problem with this
distinction is that it is precious and in practice unworkable.
Post, supra note 4, at 1757. (But is it unworkable?)
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D. Kokinda Keeps the Mystery Alive
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in United States v. Kokinda94 at-
tained instant notoriety by virtue of its surprising refusal to treat a "postal
sidewalk" as a traditional public forum, but that, of course, is not the focus of
this article.95 But, even if one accepts the plurality's resolution of that pre-
cise question, why was this particular post office sidewalk not a limited pub-
lic forum? Here is O'Connor's response to that argument:
The Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks
to any expressive activity. . . . No Postal Service regulation opens
postal sidewalks to any First Amendment activity. To be sure, in-
dividuals or groups have been permitted to leaflet, speak, and
picket on postal premises, but a regulation prohibiting disruption,
and a practice of allowing some speech activities on postal proper-
ty do not add up to the dedication of postal property to speech ac-
tivities. We have held that "[t]he government does not create a
public forum by ... permitting limited discourse, but only by in-
tentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). Even conceding that
the forum here has been dedicated to some First Amendment uses,
and thus is not a purely non-public forum, under Perry, regulation
of the reserved non-public uses would still require application of
the reasonableness test.
96
A number of questions are raised by this analysis. First and foremost is
the question of why a government property on which citizens "have been
permitted to leaflet, speak and picket" was not a limited public forum. 97 (The
meaning of the word "permitted" may or may not have relevance here. Did
O'Connor mean to suggest that those speakers sought, and were granted,
permission to leaflet, speak, and picket? Or were their leafleting, speaking,
and picketing merely tolerated by those in authority? Again, the distinction
may or may not be significant.) The challengers, who had engaged in the
solicitation of political contributions on the postal sidewalk, were convicted
of violating a federal regulation that prohibited "'[s]oliciting alms and con-
tributions, campaigning for election to any public office .... and displaying
94. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
95. Critical evaluations of that aspect of Kokinda can be found in Gey, supra note 4, at
1580-82; Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, supra note 4, at 189-91; Michael J.
Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public Forum Doctrine: United States v. Kokinda
and Its Afternath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 174-88 (1991).
96. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (citations omitted).
97. See id.
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or distributing commercial advertising on postal premises. ' '98 Since only
certain kinds of speech were expressly prohibited on these premises, is it not
fair to conclude that, by implication, all other forms of speech were allowed
at this location---especially when other forms of speech were, in fact, al-
lowed at this location? The dissenters thought so.99 As for the members of
the plurality (given O'Connor's focus on the absence of any regulation open-
ing the premises for speech), one wonders whether anything short of an ex-
press written proclamation would have sufficed to make this property a li-
mited public forum.
Particularly intriguing, and thus worth restating, is the last sentence in
the above-quoted passage: "Even conceding that the forum here has been
dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely non-public
forum, under Perry, regulation of the reserved non-public uses would still
require application of the reasonableness test."1° Note first the somewhat
odd terminology that Justice O'Connor used; while appearing to consider
(for just one brief moment) what the outcome would be if the postal sidewalk
were a limited public forum, she chose to use the words "and thus is not a
purely non-public forum," rather than the more obvious (and less trouble-
some) phrase, "and thus is a limited public forum." How exactly are we
supposed to understand the phrase "not a purely non-public forum?" Are
there degrees of non-public-forum-hood, some being more "pure" than oth-
ers? (Forgive me, but the word usage cries out for such an irreverent re-
sponse.) Alternatively, had the limited public forum concept come to be
viewed with such distaste that the term could not be used even when it was
the obvious term to use? Note further the inelegant, and tortured, use of lan-
guage later in the sentence-namely, her reference to "the reserved non-
public uses."' 0 ' Was she perhaps intending to refer to speech to which a li-
mited public forum had not been opened?
Strange semantic choices notwithstanding, that sentence can be seen as
helpfully reinforcing the rule, implicit in Perry, that, in a limited public fo-
rum, expression which does not fall within the class of speech to which the
forum has been opened may be regulated to the same extent as it could be in
a non-public forum. That is to say, O'Connor can be understood to have said
98. Id. at 724.
99. Id. at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Noting the limited restrictions of expression
contained in the regulation, Justice Brennan concluded: "The Government thus invites labor
picketing, soapbox oratory, distributing literature, holding political rallies, playing music,
circulating petitions, or any other form of speech not specifically mentioned in the regulation."
Id.
100. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
101. Id.
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that, even if the postal sidewalk were a limited public forum, it had not been
opened up for solicitation of monetary donations, and thus the prohibition of
such solicitation need only be reasonable (and, of course, not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint). The only difficulty with this interpretation is that the
sentence is too unclear to allow us to proclaim its meaning with any confi-
dence.
E. ISKCON and Rosenberger: Misleading Statements Emerge
The 1992 case typically referred to as ISKCON-International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee 102-- was not one that allowed for any
serious argument that the forum in question (a publicly-operated airport ter-
minal) was a limited public forum. It is included here only because Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in his cursory review of the forum categories in his major-
ity opinion, said this:
The second category of public property is the designated public fo-
rum, whether of a limited or unlimited character-property that the
State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.
Regulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as
that governing a traditional public forum.' 0 3
But, of course, regulation of speech in a limited public forum will not neces-
sarily be evaluated as if the property were a traditional public forum. This
imprecise statement, which had no bearing on the decision, might have had
the effect of over-valuing speech in a limited public forum, but in fact there
is no reason to think that the statement has had any effect at all on relevant
case law.
Regrettably, that cannot be said of Justice Kennedy's unhelpful pro-
nouncements in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virgin-
ia,1°4 decided in 1995. It should be understood, at the outset, that, because
the free-speech issue in this case was resolved by the majority purely on the
basis of its (questionable) finding of viewpoint discrimination, it was com-
pletely unnecessary to categorize the forum-a public university fund, cha-
racterized by Kennedy as "a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial
or geographic sense."' 05 And, in fact, while Kennedy may have appeared to
102. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
103. Id. at 678 (citation omitted).
104. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
105. Id. at 830.
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conclude that the fund was a limited public forum (as some courts"0 6 and
commentators °7 have asserted) nowhere in his opinion did he clearly and
unequivocally do so (although doing so would have been correct). Rather,
he sprinkled a couple of general statements that made reference to the limited
public forum concept into a confused paragraph whose primary thrust was
that viewpoint discrimination will not be tolerated.'0 8 Here, offered in its
entirety (aside from citations) because of the influence it has had on lower
courts, is that regrettable paragraph, which followed a paragraph which
spoke only about content and viewpoint discrimination (and said not a word
about public fora):
These principles provide the framework forbidding the State
[from] exercis[ing] viewpoint discrimination, even when the li-
mited public forum is one of its own creation. In a case involving
a school district's provision of school facilities for private uses, we
declared that "there is no question that the District, like the private
owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its con-
trol for the use to which it is dedicated." The necessities of confin-
ing a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or
for the discussion of certain topics. Once it has opened a limited
forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it
has itself set. The State may not exclude speech where its distinc-
tion is not "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum," nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint. Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to pre-
serve the limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of
a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and,
on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum's limitations."°9
The careful reader will, I trust, join me in observing that, while it may
appear that Justice Kennedy categorized the forum in question as a limited
public forum, by making reference to the concept two or three times in the
106. E.g., Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (5th Cir. 2001); Sum-
mum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 1997); Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v.
Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1549 (llth Cir. 1997).
107. McGill, supra note 4, at 929; see also Gey, supra note 4, at 1563, 1565.
108. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.
109. Id. at 829-30 (citations omitted).
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course of this discussion, he really never explicitly did so. What matters
more, however, is that he intertwined these references to the limited public
forum with indirect references to the non-public forum concept, and with the
general prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. Why? What was the need
for this discussion, when all that needed to be said was that viewpoint dis-
crimination is unacceptable, regardless of the nature of the forum? In mid-
paragraph, he actually included a statement that might have been helpful (if
elaborated upon) in clarifying the law of the limited public forum: "Once it
has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set."' ° But that statement, too, was unnecessary, in
this case, given his finding of viewpoint discrimination. Unfortunately, what
many lower courts have extracted from this discussion is the combination of
that sentence with the sentence that follows, leading to the (mis)understand-
ing that what he said was this: In a limited public forum, exclusion of a
speaker must be reasonable and must not discriminate on the basis of view-
point. That statement is true, of course, because unreasonableness or view-
point discrimination will invalidate a restriction even in a non-public forum,
so of course it will invalidate a restriction in any forum. But Kennedy's
combination of sentences has led many lower courts to the misguided con-
clusion that he asserted that these are the only grounds for invalidating a pro-
hibition of speech in a limited public forum."' But he did not say that, in so
many words, and, if he had, one would have to wonder why the limited pub-
lic forum was suddenly being equated, for all intents and purposes, with the
non-public forum.
F. Forbes to the Doctrinal Rescue?
Somewhat ironically, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,"2 decided three years after
Rosenberger, is arguably the United States Supreme Court's majority opi-
nion that provides the most guidance with respect to distinguishing between
a limited public forum and a non-public forum. (I say that this is somewhat
ironic because it is also arguably the least satisfying of the United States Su-
preme Court's public-forum decisions, in terms of its result)."3  Ralph
110. Id.
111. E.g., Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007); Husain v.
Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2007); Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v.
Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
113. But see the discussion of Forbes in Schauer, culminating in this suggestion:
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Forbes, an independent candidate for Congress in Arkansas, sought to partic-
ipate in a televised debate to which only the Democratic and Republican
candidates had been invited by the debate's organizer, AETC, described as
"an Arkansas state agency owning and operating a network of five noncom-
mercial television stations."' 4 The organizers of the event denied Forbes'
request, because they had "'decided to limit participation in the debates to
the major party candidates or any other candidate who had strong popular
support'"l.. 5-a class of speakers which, in the view of the organizers, did not
include Forbes.'1 6 Was the debate a limited public forum? A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit thought so, and Judge Arnold's ex-
planation is notable for its forcefulness:
We can say without reservation, . .. that the forum in this case, the
debate, is a limited public forum. Just as the university in Widmar
created a limited public forum by opening its facilities to regis-
tered student groups for expressive speech, AETN, by staging the
debate, opened its facilities to a particular group--candidates run-
ning for the Third District Congressional seat....
The debate was surely a place opened by the government for a
limited class of speakers. What was that class? Was it all candi-
dates for Congress legally qualified to appear on the ballot, or was
it simply the Republican and Democratic candidates? The latter
answer, which essentially is the position espoused by defendants,
is not supportable either as a matter of law or logic. Surely gov-
ernment cannot, simply by its own ipse dixit, define a class of
speakers so as to exclude a person who would naturally be ex-
pected to be a member of the class on no basis other than party af-
filiation. It must be emphasized that we are dealing here with po-
litical speech by legally qualified candidates, a subject matter at
the very core of the First Amendment, and that exclusion of one
such speaker has the effect of a prior restraint-it keeps his views
from the public on the occasion in question."
l7
But a majority of the Supreme Court held that the state agency could
limit the class of favored speakers in the way in which AETC had limited
Although the doctrinal structure of the majority opinion in Forbes is focused on public forum
doctrine... in the end it is the institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting,
heightened here by the involvement of broadcasting professionals in the very decision under
attack, that appears to have determined the outcome of the case.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 91.
114. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669.
115. Id. at 670.
116. See id. at 670-71.
117. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996).
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it." 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ultimately deemed the debate
to be a non-public forum."9
Kennedy began his "forum" discussion in the usual fashion, briefly de-
scribing each of the three categories of forum and correlating the categories
with the applicable constitutional tests.12 0  In the process of doing so, he
made this very helpful statement regarding "designated" public fora: "[i]f
the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a des-
ignated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict
scrutiny."' 2' This statement-which really pertains to the concept of a li-
mited public forum (the term I wish Kennedy had used)-was a most wel-
come reinforcement of the rule implied by Perry's suggestion that "entities
of similar character" would enjoy a right of access to a limited forum. 2 2 But
even this helpful dictum was flawed, because, by referring only to "strict
scrutiny," it ignored the possibility that a distinction among speakers might
not be content-based.
23
Moving to the third category of fora, Kennedy made this intriguing
statement: "[o]ther government properties are either non-public fora or not
fora at all."' 24 "Not fora at all?" What did that mean? Did not the tripartite
regime set forth in Perry represent the entire universe of governmentally
owned properties and channels of communication? Perhaps he had in mind
the kind of case in which the inherent need for the exercise of governmental
discretion-as in public broadcasting, generally, 25 or the selection of books
by a public library' 26-- is deemed to render any "forum" analysis inapplica-
ble.
118. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669.
119. Id. at 680. Surprisingly, the three dissenters did not adopt the position taken by the
court of appeals. See id. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Said Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and Justices Souter and Ginsburg: "The dispositive issue in this case . . .is not
whether AETC created a designated public forum or a non-public forum .... but whether
AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient specificity to justify the exclu-
sion of a ballot-qualified candidate." Id.
120. Id. at 677-78 (majority opinion).
121. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
123. Kennedy, of all Justices, must have known that, since, in ISKCON, he concurred in
the judgment on the grounds that the airport terminal was a public forum, but the ban on soli-
citation was a reasonable (content-neutral) time, place and manner regulation. See Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
124. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
125. Id. at 675.
126. See the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. American
Library Ass'n, finding forum analysis incompatible "with the discretion that public libraries
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But why did Kennedy overturn the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the debate in Forbes was a limited public forum? In fact, he never even
used that term, addressing instead the question of whether the debate was a
"designated" public forum, and finding that it was not.'27 In the process, he
set forth a relatively extensive explanation of the governing criteria, which
deserves quotation at some length:
To create a forum of this type, the government must intend to
make the property "generally available," to a class of speakers....
A designated public forum is not created when the government al-
lows selective access for individual speakers rather than general
access for a class of speakers .... The basis for the holding in Per-
ry was explained by the Court in Cornelius: "In contrast to the
general access policy in Widmar, school board policy did not grant
general access to the school mail system. The practice was to re-
quire permission from the individual school principal before
access to the system to communicate with teachers was granted."
And in Cornelius itself, the Court held the Combined Federal
Campaign (CFC) charity drive was not a designated public forum
because "[t]he Government's consistent policy ha[d] been to...
require agencies seeking admission to obtain permission from fed-
eral and local Campaign officials."
These cases illustrate the distinction between "general
access," which indicates the property is a designated public forum,
and "selective access," which indicates the property is a non-
public forum .... [T]he government does not create a designated
public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose mem-
bers must then, as individuals, "obtain permission" to use it.
128
Kennedy then applied those considerations to the case at hand, as follows:
Here, the debate did not have an open-microphone format....
AETC did not make its debate generally available to candidates for
Arkansas' Third Congressional District seat. Instead, just as the
Federal Government in Cornelius reserved eligibility for participa-
tion in the CFC program to certain classes of voluntary agencies,
must have to fulfill their traditional missions." 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003). See also Nat'l
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998). A lower court decision (involv-
ing plaintiffs who were denied the opportunity to speak at town meetings) in which the public
forum analysis was somewhat inexplicably deemed to be "inapposite" is Cumin v. Town of
Egremont, 510 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
127. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
128. Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
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AETC reserved eligibility for participation in the debate to candi-
dates for Third Congressional District seat .... At that point, just
as the Government in Cornelius made agency-by-agency determi-
nations as to which of the eligible agencies would participate in the
CFC, AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to
which of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.
"Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum." Thus
the debate was a non-public forum.'
2 9
At long last, we had been given some concrete guidelines. But, are they
sufficiently concrete? The key distinction, it seems, is that between "general
access for a class of speakers," on the one hand, and "selective access for
individual speakers," on the other. But it has never been clear how to distin-
guish "general" from "selective" access, words that were not new to this opi-
nion. Here, however, there was the added contrast between access "for a
class of speakers" and access "for individual speakers." But how helpful is
that? If we focus on the application of these principles to this very case, it
seems fair to say that the "selective access" which Justice Kennedy found
here was extended to a "class" of speakers (congressional candidates), and
not to randomly-selected individuals. Indeed, Kennedy stated, in that part of
his discussion, that the government in Cornelius "reserved eligibility for par-
ticipation in the CFC program to certain classes of voluntary agencies.""13
So, the "selective access" that defeats a finding of a limited public forum
may, it seems, be either "random" access or access that is extended only to
persons or groups that fall into a defined class of speakers. In the former
instance, in which disparate speakers have been allowed access on a sporadic
basis, we would apparently lack the crucial evidence of a governmental in-
tent to open the property to a "general class" of speakers. In the latter in-
stance, it is apparently a second step that really counts toward a finding of
"selective access"-the selection of speakers, by the relevant government
actor, within a defined class. Given this second understanding of "selective
access," the ability to distinguish it from "general access for a class of speak-
ers" remains elusive.
Potentially more helpful, however, is the fact of Justice Kennedy's re-
peated references, in this mini-tutorial, to the concept of "permission." The
need to obtain "permission" on an individualized basis, as a condition of
access to the forum at issue, he explained, is a key characteristic of a non-
public forum, even in situations that look like "general access" cases, and
129. Id. at 680.
130. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
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explains why Perry and Cornelius (in which such permission was required)
did not involve limited public fora. Widmar, in contrast, was viewed as in-
volving a situation (again, the availability of university facilities to registered
student organizations) in which individualized permission was not required;
the property was "generally available" to all members of the favored class of
speakers. The last sentence of his statement of general principles, quoted
above, can thus be seen as capturing the essence of his message: "[T]he
government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more
than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speak-
ers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use
it.' 3' As the quoted statements make clear, this "permission" factor had
been highlighted in Cornelius,132 over a decade earlier, but Kennedy's disser-
tation in Forbes put the spotlight on this variable in a much more emphatic
way. 133
Two major questions immediately come to mind with regard to this
suggested key to the limited public forum puzzle: First, is it workable, and
second, does it make sense? We will return to those questions shortly.
G. Good News Club: A Big Step Backward
Whatever contribution to clarity may have been made by Forbes was
needlessly and regrettably undercut by Justice Thomas' pronouncements in
the 2001 case of Good News Club v. Milford Central School. 34 The Good
News Club sought access, on an "after hours" basis, to public school facili-
ties that had been opened to use by other outside organizations for various
expressive purposes.135 The forum in question appeared to be a limited pub-
lic forum, the parties agreed on that characterization, and Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court majority, was willing to assume that this was the proper
category. 36 But, as in Rosenberger, the category of forum was unimportant,
given the majority's (questionable) finding of viewpoint discrimination. 37
Here, however, is what Thomas said next, concerning the applicable consti-
tutional test:
131. Id., at 679 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 804 (1985)).
132. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803--04
(1985).
133. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80.
134. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
135. Id. at 102-03.
136. Id. at 106.
137. See id. at 107.
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When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type
of speech. The State may be justified "in reserving its forum for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics." The State's
power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The re-
striction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint, and the restriction must be "reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum."'
' 38
The first three assertions in that paragraph are unexceptional, and clearly
accurate. The last sentence is not inaccurate, because those limitations apply
regardless of the nature of the forum, but the problem, as in Rosenberger,
39
is the immediate juxtaposition of (a) statements describing the nature of a
limited public forum with (b) the two-part test governing the constitutionality
of restrictions on speech in a non-public forum. The reader-unless he
knows enough to recognize the incongruity between this presentation and
earlier pronouncements concerning these matters-may be justified in con-
cluding that the Court had just stated unambiguously that an exclusion of any
speaker from a limited public forum would be subject only to that two-part
test. Understandably, but regrettably, that is how some lower federal courts
have understood Thomas' statement of governing legal doctrine. 40
H. Synthesizing the Supreme Court's Limited Public Forum Jurispru-
dence
1. The Court's Pronouncements
While the Justices have, over the years, made frequent use of the term
"limited public forum," the Court has never defined, or adequately explained
the meaning of, that concept. The closest the Court has come to defining the
term was its initial indication, in Perry, that a public forum might "be created
for a limited purpose" 14'-a statement made in a footnote which sprang from
Justice White's discussion of the second public forum category, a category
that now dependably bears the label "designated public forum." Can there be
any reasonable doubt, then, that the limited public forum is a sub-category of
the designated public forum category? The further discussion of the limited
138. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
140. E.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch.,
457 F.3d 376, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2006); Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,
626 (2d Cir. 2005); Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 (5th Cir. 2001).
141. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983).
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public forum concept in Perry,4 2 furthermore, augmented both by 1) the
reaffirmation of Perry's implications in ISKCON14 3 and Forbes 44 and 2) the
constant citation (and description) of Widmar with approval, make clear
enough how a court is to evaluate limitations on speech in a limited public
forum: The court should first determine the class of speakers to whom the
forum has been opened, and then decide whether the excluded speaker falls
within that favored class; if the speaker falls within the favored class, the
forum should be treated as if it were a traditional public forum, but if the
speaker falls outside of the favored class, then the forum should be treated as
if it were a non-public forum. Occasional inconsistent, ill-considered pas-
sages (in the Court's Rosenberger 45 and Good News Club'46 opinions),
which suggest that the limited public forum is, in every case, to be treated as
if it were a non-public forum, should be viewed as just that-ill-considered,
and inconsistent with the more logical and coherent statements made in Per-
ry and Forbes-and, accordingly, ignored.'47
With regard to the challenging task of deciding when a limited (or des-
ignated) public forum has been created, two majority opinions are dominant:
The seminal opinion by Justice O'Connor in Cornelius, making clear that the
government's intent is the key, 148 and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Forbes,
with its emphasis on a speaker's need to obtain permission as the major vari-
able distinguishing "selective" access from "general" access.
149
2. The Court's Rulings
With regard to the proper understanding and treatment of the limited
public forum, there are few specimens to consider, since the Court has not
found any governmental property to be a limited (or designated) public fo-
142. See id. at 46-47.
143. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
145. See supra text accompanying note 109.
146. See supra text accompanying note 138.
147. It should be noted, however, that a further note of uncertainty regarding these matters
was sounded by Justice Breyer, in dictum, in a plurality opinion in 1996, in which he declined
to apply the public forum doctrine to an unconventional setting ("leased access" cable televi-
sion channels). Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749
(1996). Writing for four Justices, in clear reference to the concept of the limited public forum,
he stated, somewhat cryptically: "Our cases have not yet determined, however, that [the
G]overnment's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content or another is neces-
sarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny." Id. at 750.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
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rum since the pre-Perry decision in Widmar, which, while it pre-dated the
Court's crystallization of its governing categories and rules, still stands as the
preeminent example of a limited public forum.15 We can draw little guid-
ance from what the Court has actually done, then, with regard to the limited
(or designated) public forum.
We can, however, inquire as to whether the Court's pre-Forbes rulings
support the primacy of "permission" as the key variable explaining when we
have merely "selective," as opposed to "general," access to a forum which
has been opened to at least some speakers. (The distinction would rather
clearly seem to be irrelevant in cases, like ISKCON151 and United States
Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n,152 in which there is no
evidence that the property has been opened to anyone for expressive purpos-
es). Bearing in mind that an earlier opinion may understandably fail to shed
light on the existence or non-existence of a factor whose significance was far
from clear at the time the opinion was written, and recognizing that some
prior rulings may simply not conform to a mode of analysis that did not
emerge until years later, we are nonetheless compelled to observe that the
pattern of prior decisions is not consistent with regard to Kennedy's thesis in
Lehman (involving rapid transit system advertising spaces)153 and Greer (in-
volving political campaigning on a military base)1 54 do appear to take their
places comfortably alongside Perry and Cornelius as cases involving situa-
tions in which a prospective speaker needed to obtain permission from a con-
trolling governmental authority as a condition of access to the property in
question. In Kokinda, as was observed earlier, citizens had "been permitted
to leaflet, speak and picket" on the postal sidewalk, 55 but it is unclear wheth-
150. The other case cited in Perry as an example of a "limited" forum, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7
(1983), City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), in which a school board meeting was generally open to
members of the public for comments, spoke neither of forum categories nor of any level of
judicial review. In his majority opinion for a unanimous Court (which ruled in favor of the
excluded speaker), Chief Justice Burger said merely that "[w]here the State has opened a
forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers."
Id. at 175. The Heffron decision of 1981, as noted earlier, is perhaps the only true example, at
the Supreme Court level, of a designated public forum not limited as to subject matter or
speaker identity. See Heffran v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
654-55 (1981). But the decision teaches us nothing, with respect to the problems at hand,
since the government actor in that case made no attempt to exclude the speakers from the
forum.
151. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
152. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
153. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974).
154. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
155. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
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er the word "permitted" denoted (a) that those speakers had been required to
ask and receive permission, or (b) that the presence of those speakers had
merely been tolerated.
But of the three cases cited in Perry as examples of designated public
fora, only one-City of Madison-seems to fall into the "open to all speak-
ers, no permission required" category (keeping in mind that the forum was a
school board meeting, so that only speech related to "school board business"
was permitted). 156 Widmar, in contrast (and notwithstanding its treatment by
Justice Kennedy in Forbes), does not seem to have involved a "no permis-
sion required" situation, as this sentence from Justice Powell's majority opi-
nion reveals: "From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meet-
ings in University facilities."1 57
(Each of these rare exemplars of the limited public forum concept, it
should be noted, differs from the more typical such case in that, in each, the
government actor in direct control of the forum was not actually motivated
by a desire to exclude the challenger for any reason relating to the effect of
the speech on the forum.) In City of Madison, the speaker who was supposed
to be barred from the forum-by a state labor-relations statute-had actually
been permitted to speak by the school board at its meeting; litigation ensued
only after a third party, after the fact, challenged the legitimacy of the school
board's action.158 In Widmar, university officials sought to bar the religious
student group from using the school's facilities for expressive purposes, but
only because those university officials feared that continuing to grant access
to the religious group would violate the Establishment Clause;159 the Su-
156. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983)
(citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976)). In Minnesota State Board. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271
(1984), Justice O'Connor distinguished City of Madison, stating that the school board meet-
ings "at issue there were 'opened [as] a forum for direct citizen involvement,'. . . and 'public
participation [was] permitted."' Id. at 281. The First Amendment was violated, she went on
to say, "when the meetings were suddenly closed to one segment of the public even though
they otherwise remained open for participation by the public at large." Id.
157. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). See also Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d
1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980). The other pertinent Supreme Court case involving a state univer-
sity, Rosenberger (in which Justice Kennedy may have appeared to find that the fund in ques-
tion was a limited public forum, but actually made no such explicit finding), was also a setting
in which an application was required. Rosenberger v. Rector & Vistors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 823 (1995). Permission was required as well in Good News Club, a case in which
the parties stipulated that the school premises constituted a limited public forum. Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
158. City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 172.
159. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.3.
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preme Court could have resolved the dispute by deciding only-as it did-
that the Establishment Clause concern was groundless.' 6°
The third decision put forth in Perry as an example of a designated pub-
lic forum, Conrad, not only involved a governmentally-controlled property
(a municipally operated theater) whose use was made available only through
an application process,16 ' but appears to be completely out of sync with later
decisions. A majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun,
found fault with a municipal board's rejection of an application to stage a
controversial musical stage play at the theater in question. 62 Key to the de-
cision was Blackmun's preliminary conclusion that the theater in question
was a "public forum[] designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.' 63
But surely this was not a governmental forum that had been opened to any
and all members of a particular class of speakers, with no discretion reserved
to the officials in charge of the property.
Other decisions simply do not fit as comfortably into either the "permis-
sion required" or "no permission required" paradigms. Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 64 for example, which extended the public forum doc-
trine to the public school setting, involved a claim by student staff members
of a high school newspaper that their First Amendment rights had been vi-
olated when certain student-authored articles were removed from the news-
paper prior to its publication.'65 Justice White, for the majority, found, in
effect, that the newspaper was a non-public forum. 166 The newspaper had
arguably been opened to written expression by a particular class of speak-
ers-namely, student members of the newspaper's staff-and it did not ap-
pear that a formal system was in place pursuant to which "permission"
needed to be obtained before an article could be published. 167 But the key to
the decision was the undeniable maintenance of ultimate control over the
contents of the newspaper by the journalism teacher and the school princip-
al.' 68 Forbes itself, ironically, involved no requirement that permission be
160. Id. at 273-75.
161. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1975).
162. Id. at 562.
163. Id. at 555.
164. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
165. Id. at 262.
166. Id. at 270.
167. Id. at 268-70.
168. See id. at 269. Pervasive governmental control of the forum can be seen as explain-
ing the result in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977),
as well. A lower court decision placing primary emphasis on "whether the government has
exercised a sufficient degree of control over the forum" is Pocatello Education Ass'n v.
Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
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granted as a condition of access to the forum in question, a one-time tele-
vised candidates' debate. Access was allowed, instead, on an "invitation-
only" basis.' 69
We may conclude, then, that most, but not all, of the Court's precedents
support Justice Kennedy's attempt to explain them in Forbes. Based primar-
ily on Forbes itself, and to a lesser extent Hazelwood, we might also con-
clude, for the sake of achieving greater descriptive accuracy, that what has
mattered, almost always, in the cases in which a denial of access to a forum
has been upheld by the Supreme Court, is the presence of a governmental
"gatekeeper" of sorts-meaning, a government actor who, either through a
process of inviting certain speakers, requiring speakers to obtain permission
to speak (and granting it only sometimes), or otherwise exercising ongoing
control over the expressive enterprise, made it quite clear that the govern-
ment did not mean to open the forum to all speakers falling within a particu-
lar class. We will return to the question of whether this "gatekeeper" con-
cept provides a workable and sensible basis for distinguishing between des-
ignated and limited public fora, on the one hand, and non-public fora, on the
other.
III. How HAVE THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS UNDERSTOOD "THE
MIDDLE CATEGORY?"
Our understanding of "the middle category"' 170 of governmental fo-
rum-focusing primarily on the limited public forum but, of necessity, em-
bracing as well the designated public forum-may be enhanced by a consid-
eration of how federal appellate courts (who have had many more opportuni-
ties than has the Supreme Court to address these issues) have dealt with it.
What do these courts understand to be meant by the phrase "limited public
forum?"' 1  What legal consequences flow from that label? Have lower
courts found designated and limited public fora, and, if so, to what extent
have they been guided by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Forbes in reaching
such results?
169. Ark Educ. Television Comm'n v Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1988).
170. The term is commonly used to embrace the designated and limited public forum
concepts. See, e.g., Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 2005).
171. For a fairly comprehensive review-with a somewhat different focus-of lower court
case law in this area, as of 2002, see Fischer, supra note 4, at 657-70. See also Mary Jean
Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions
of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 80-100 (2004).
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A. Competing Understandings of the Terminology
The federal courts of appeals remain strikingly divided with respect to
their understanding of what it means to pin the label "limited public forum"
upon a governmentally controlled property or channel of communication. At
the risk of over-simplification, these courts can essentially be placed into one
of two groups: Those who, like your humble author, are guided by the im-
plications of Perry and Forbes, and those who have been influenced primari-
ly by the misleading statements made in the Rosenberger and Good News
Club decisions.
In the first group are, most dependably, the Second and Fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The Second Circuit's understanding, dating back more
than twenty years, 172 was perhaps best expressed in the following passage
from a fairly recent decision:
A subset of the designated public forum, the "limited" public
forum, exists "where the government opens a non-public forum
but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to
the discussion of certain subjects." . . . In limited public fora, strict
scrutiny is accorded only to restrictions on speech that falls within
the designated category for which the forum has been opened....
As to expressive uses not falling within the limited category for
which the forum has been opened, restrictions need only be view-
point neutral and reasonable. 17
3
The Second Circuit has, moreover, actually utilized this approach. 174
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while employing uniquely
creative (but dispensable) terminology, appears rather clearly to be in agree-
ment with the Second Circuit, as this (necessarily) lengthy excerpt from a
fairly recent Fourth Circuit decision reveals:
172. Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986).
173. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Parks &
Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); accord Make the Road
by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton,
95 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 1996); Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692
(2d Cir. 1991). But see Amidon v. Student Ass'n of State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d
94, 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2007); Peck v. Bald-
winsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,626 (2d Cir. 2005); Gen. Media Commc'n v. Cohen,
131 F.3d 273, 278 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997).
174. Travis, 927 F.2d at 693 ("Travis's program was the same type as a previously permit-
ted use. Even if the forum was limited, Travis, being within the category for which use had
been permitted, could not be denied access absent a sufficient constitutional justification.").
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When a particular forum is classified as a designated/limited
public forum, "[tiwo levels of First Amendment analysis" apply:
the "internal standard" and the "external standard." The "internal
standard" applies to situations where "'the government excludes a
speaker who falls within the class to which a designated [limited]
public forum is made generally available."' In this situation, the
government's "'action is subject to strict scrutiny."' In other
words, "as regards the class for which the forum has been desig-
nated, a limited public forum is treated as a traditional public fo-
rum." On the other hand, the "external standard" "places restric-
tions on the government's ability to designate the class for whose
especial benefit the forum has been opened." We explained that
"once a limited forum has been created, entities of a 'similar cha-
racter' to those allowed access may not be excluded." The gov-
ernment's designation of the class for the "external standard" is
"subject only to the standards applicable to restrictions on speakers
in a non-public forum," namely that "the selection of a class by the
government must only be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light
of the objective purposes served by the forum."' 175
And, as in the Second Circuit, this approach has actually been used by the
Fourth Circuit.
176
The Third, Eighth, and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to be
in agreement. 177 In addition, panels of the Sixth 178 and Eleventh 79 Circuits,
175. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting that court's en banc
opinion in Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted)). Accord ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005).
176. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 251 ("[T]o determine which standard to apply to the Board's
exclusion of the plaintiffs in this case, we must determine whether homeschoolers as a group
are an entity of a 'similar character' to those groups permitted to use the community cen-
ters.").
177. See Preminger v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006); Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans
Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Goldin, 311 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir.
2002); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. PA Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir.
1998). But see Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386
F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004). Note, however (as reflective of the persistent confusion in the
use of public forum terminology), that the court in Preminger stated that a "designated" public
forum "is an area dedicated by the government for a certain class of speakers." Preminger,
517 F.3d at 1311.
178. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). This decision can also be
understood as having, alternatively, viewed the restriction as content-based and employed
strict scrutiny. Id. at 355. See also Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d
834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
179. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 802-03 (11th Cir. 2004); Crowder v.
Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1993).
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albeit with far less explication of general doctrinal understanding, have ap-
plied time, place and manner analyses to content-neutral restrictions on
speech in limited public fora.
In contrast, a number of other federal appellate courts, taking seriously
the misleading discussions in Rosenberger180 and Good News Club,181 treat
the limited public forum designation as if it were synonymous with "non-
public forum"' 82-sometimes even while stating that the "limited public fo-
rum is a sub-category of a designated public forum!' ' 183 A panel of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit even referred to "a non-public forum (some-
times called a limited public forum).'" ' 4
Recognizing that lower court judges must defer to the United States Su-
preme Court when it comes to constitutional pronouncements (at least when
they are clear and consistent), one may nonetheless wonder how any reason-
able jurist could believe that, in a scheme apparently comprising four catego-
ries, two of them--one labeled "limited" and one labeled "non"-are to be
treated as exactly the same. What meaning is assigned to the word "limited"
if that equation is made? While some of us are inclined to perceive the
phrase "limited public forum" in a "positive" way, connoting a place that has
been opened to expression, but on a limited basis (a glass half full, if you
will) it appears to be possible to think of "limited" as having a primarily
"negative" connotation, tending to denote that the property is presumptively
"closed" to expression (i.e., a glass half empty). Thus, one panel of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "a given forum may be designated for
180. See supra text accompanying note 109.
181. See supra text accompanying note 138.
182. See, e.g., Cumin v. Town of Egremont, 510 F.3d 24, 28 (lst Cir. 2007); Ridley v.
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) ("We adopt the usage equating
limited public forum with non-public forum and do not discuss the issue further."); Hopper v.
City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) ("This categorization admittedly leads
to the strange semantic result that a limited public forum is not actually a public forum.");
Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 n.14 (10th Cir. 2007) ("We use the term 'limited
public forum' here to denote a particular species of non-public forum ...."). Even one com-
mentator has asserted that "the 'limited public forum' is a subset of the 'non-public' forum."
Dolan, supra note 171, at 77. Similar confusion pervades the discussion in Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1370-71 & n.l 17 (2001).
The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has been persistent in taking this approach. Ariz. Life Coal.
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2008); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 831 (9th
Cir. 2007); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2007); Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1043 (2004); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.
2003).
183. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074.
184. Ridley, 390 F.3d at 76.
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one class of speaker or speech, and still 'limited' with respect to others.' 85
But a panel of the Tenth Circuit, using terminology that threatens to compli-
cate matters to an intolerable degree, stated that "a designated public forum
for a limited purpose and a limited public forum are not interchangeable
terms, 186 thus giving no meaning to the latter phrase.
B. "Middle Category" Decisions
1. Rulings
The United States Supreme Court, of course, has not found a govern-
mental property to be a limited (or even a designated) public forum since
Widmar in 1981. Dissenting in Cornelius in 1985, Justice Blackmun com-
plained that, given the approach set forth therein, the Court had made "it
virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class of
speakers is a limited public forum., 187 His core reasoning, shared by critics
of the Court's public forum doctrine, is worth restating:
If the Government does not create a limited public forum unless it
intends to provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if
the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government
did not intend to create such a forum, no speaker challenging deni-
al of access will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited
public forum. 188
Was Justice Blackmun right? Has it proven to be virtually impossible
to persuade a court that a governmental property or channel of communica-
tion is a designated or limited public forum? The good (and perhaps surpris-
ing) news, for partisans of freedom of expression, is that it has not. 89 A
185. Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has
given hints of agreement with the understanding of "limited public forum" shared by the
Second and Fourth Circuits, but has stopped short of taking such an approach unambiguously.
Id. at 769; Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001). The two opi-
nions cited in this note project, more than anything else, a sense of uncertainty concerning the
terminology. Id. at 345-46; Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 765 n.6.
186. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 916 n.14.
187. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (internal citation omitted). See supra text accompanying note 92.
189. The discussion of cases that follows is not intended to be exhaustive, and is based
primarily on a consideration of federal appellate decisions rendered subsequent to the Su-
preme Court's 1998 decision in Forbes. Note, too, that cases discussed herein in which the
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number of recent holdings of federal appellate courts indicate that designated
and limited public fora do exist.
The public university setting has yielded the most persuasive examples
of unlimited designated fora. At least two appellate courts have held the
outdoor open areas of such campuses to be designated public fora,9 ' but
since, in one of those cases, the areas in question appear to have been opened
only to members of the university community, 91 the court probably should
have found a limited, as opposed to an unlimited, public forum (since the
challenger was a student group, the distinction would not have affected the
subsequent analysis). In each of these cases, the open nature of the forum
was presumptively important, as the court, in each case, went on to find that
a content-neutral restriction failed intermediate scrutiny. 92 Another court
properly found that a bulletin board on a state university campus, open to use
by the general public, was a designated public forum.'93
Lehman notwithstanding, at least three federal appellate courts have
found public-transit system advertising spaces--on the exterior panels of
buses1 94 or in subway and railroad stations195-to be designated public fora.
The forum, in each case, might well have been deemed a limited, as opposed
to an unlimited forum because, in each, the forum was open only to advertis-
ing (admittedly broadly defined) and in one of the cases, the governing poli-
cy excluded several categories of ads. 196 (The persuasiveness of these courts'
reasoning will be considered in the next section). The court went on to rule
in favor of the challenger, on the merits of its First Amendment claim, in
each of the three cases; in two of the three, the court found that a content-
based exclusion would not withstand strict scrutiny,'97 but found as well in
court is seen as having found a "limited public forum" do not include cases in which that
phrase was understood by the court to be synonymous with "non-public forum."
190. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967,979 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410
F.3d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2005).
191. See Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 768.
192. Id. at 772; Bowman, 444 F.3d at 981-82.
193. Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858
(2001). Because the Court went on to find that the removal of the plaintiff's handbills
amounted to viewpoint discrimination, the finding of a designated public forum turned out to
be unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Id.
194. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.,
163 F.3d 341, 355 (6th Cir. 1998); N.Y. Mag. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d
Cir. 1998).
195. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 244 (3d Cir.
1998).
196. United Food, 163 F.3d at 353.
197. Id. at 355; Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255.
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the alternative, that the exclusion was not even reasonable, 98 thus rendering
the forum categorization non-dispositive.
Another court held that when city officials extended a general invitation
to artists to display their works in the hallways of city hall, they created a
designated public forum.' 99 (The persuasiveness of this holding will also be
considered in the next section). Again, the court probably should have found
(at most) that a limited public forum had been created, since the forum had
been opened only to works of art (which, however defined, would surely
leave out some other forms of expression); but again, the distinction was
unimportant here because the plaintiffs were indisputably artists. The court
went on to rule that the content-based exclusion of the plaintiffs' works
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. 2°
Appellate courts have also discerned the existence of limited public fora
in the truest and most meaningful sense. An easy example, given the United
States Supreme Court's decision in City of Madison, is a case in which a city
council meeting, at which city residents or taxpayers were permitted to
speak, was deemed to be a limited public forum.2°' (The court then upheld
what it saw-questionably-as a content-neutral restriction on comments by
nonresidents).2 °2  Another good example is a city's "voters' pamphlet,"
which was limited to "'statements by a candidate . . . about the candidate
himself or herself,' 20 3 thus obviously limited by both content and speaker
identity.204 (But while the court correctly deemed the pamphlet to be a li-
mited public forum, it incorrectly subjected the content-based limitation to
only the reasonableness level of review, and upheld it). 205 Yet another good
example is a case involving access to the outdoor areas of a public university
campus, held to be a limited public forum open to members of the university
community but not to outsiders (including the plaintiffs). °4
In addition, at least one appellate court found meeting rooms in a coun-
ty community center to be limited public fora,2"7 but held that the challengers
198. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255; United Food, 163 F.3d at 358.
199. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001).
200. Id.
201. Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802.
202. Id. at 803.
203. Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting WASH.
REV. CODE § 29.81A.030(3) (2003)).
204. Id. at 814.
205. Id. at 814, 818.
206. ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2005).
207. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 251 (4th Cir. 2003). Another court made the
credible determination that a meeting room in a public library was a limited public forum, but
treated the limited public fora as equivalent to non-public fora, and upheld the exclusion of the
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(two families seeking to use the facilities for "homeschooling") did not con-
stitute "an entity of a 'similar character' to those groups permitted to use the
community centers. 2 °8 Another court held that a state's specialty license
plate program was a limited public forum open "to only nonprofit organiza-
tions with community driven purposes" that complied with certain additional
requirements.209 A far less obvious example of a limited public forum, final-
ly, is a university yearbook, which was deemed to have been opened to the
yearbook's student editors (including the plaintiffs herein). 2 0 The court went
on to find that the challenged government action-confiscation and ban on
distribution of the yearbook, based in part on its content-failed every level
of judicial review, including reasonableness.2t
2. "General" or "Selective" Access?
a. Use of the Forbes "Permission" Factor
In the post-Forbes federal appellate cases in which the forum had been
opened to some, but not all, speakers, thereby necessitating a ruling as to
whether "general" or merely "selective" access had been granted, the "per-
mission" factor identified by Justice Kennedy in Forbes has not been consis-
tently utilized. Some courts have (reasonably) deemed fora to be "non-
public," despite the fact that some speakers had been granted access thereto,
with no explicit consideration of the fact that speakers needed permission as
a condition of access,1 2 while other courts have ignored the existence of
plaintiff therefrom. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908,
910 (9th Cir. 2007). A comparable decision is Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey
Inc. v. Stafford Township School District, in which then-Judge Alito made the defensible
finding (with minimal explanation) that a school district's practice of distributing certain
community-group materials to students-through flyers and posting, etc.-had the effect of
creating limited public fora. 386 F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004). But, per Rosenberger, he then
appeared to subject the exclusion of plaintiffs' materials from these media of distribution to
only the lowest level of judicial review, but ultimately found that the exclusion was view-
point-discriminatory. Id. at 528.
208. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 251.
209. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2008).
210. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Husain v. Springer,
494 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 2007) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to a college
student newspaper).
211. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 354-56.
212. E.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77-82 (1st Cir. 2004); Uptown
Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 337 F.3d 1275, 1280 (1 th Cir. 2003).
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permit requirements in finding that designated fora had been created.213 But
other courts have given great weight to the permission factor, sensibly find-
ing only selective access-and, accordingly, non-public fora-when permis-
sion was required as a condition of access.214
A number of other courts, meanwhile, have addressed the permission
factor in ways that both (a) suggest the possibility of some judicial resistance
to its influence, and (b) raise questions as to its meaning and utility.
One such case is Goulart v. Meadows,"5 in which two "homeschooling
mothers" sought to use space at a county community center "for meetings of
a geography club and a fiber arts club. 2 16 A written Community Center Use
Policy governed access to the county's community centers, and required
written applications for use of any such center to be submitted to a
"Recreation Coordinator," who had "'the right to refuse or revoke any appli-
cation not in accordance with"' the Use Policy. 2 7 That policy, as modified,
did "not permit homeschool instructors to use the community centers to offer
homeschool educational classes intended to satisfy state educational re-
quirements. 21 8  The uses for which access was sought in this case were
deemed by the Recreation Coordinator to run afoul of that restriction.219 So,
had the county afforded "general" or merely "selective" access to these
community centers? Was it not clear that permission was required, as a con-
dition of such access, thus pointing to the conclusion that access was "selec-
tive?" The court thought otherwise, as the following key paragraph reveals:
We are not persuaded that the community centers at issue in this
case are non-public fora. First, the Recreation Coordinators at the
213. E.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2008); Bowman v.
White, 444 F.3d 967, 976-80 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 767-
69 (5th Cir. 2005). See also Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.
2001).
214. E.g., Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167-69 (2d Cir. 2001); Putnam Pit, Inc. v.
City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Make the Road by Walk-
ing, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 145-47 (2d Cir. 2004). Note, too, that courts that inappro-
priately equate the concepts of "non-public forum" and "limited public forum" have at times
given weight to a permission requirement in finding the existence of a "limited" public forum,
but treated that "limited" public forum as if it were a non-public forum. E.g., Faith Ctr.
Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908-10 (9th Cir. 2007); Hills v.
Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2003). See also
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 941-42 (5th Cir. 2000).
215. 345 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2003).
216. Id. at 241.
217. Id. at 242.
218. Id. at244.
219. Id. at 244-45.
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community centers make only ministerial judgments because they
are allowed to deny an application only if it is "not in accordance
with the provisions outlined in the [Use Policy]." In other words,
if a proposed user falls within the confines of the Use Policy, the
application will be granted. Here, permission to use the communi-
ty centers is not "selective," but is "granted as a matter of course"
to all individuals or groups who fall within the Use Policy. In ad-
dition, Calvert County has intentionally made the community cen-
ters generally available to certain types of expressive activity. For
example, the community centers are open to a wide variety of in-
structional activities .... We classify the community centers as
designated or limited public fora and will analyze the restrictions
here accordingly.
220
The challengers were nonetheless unsuccessful, because the court went
on to find, sensibly, that they did not fall within the category of speakers to
whom the forum had been opened.221 But, given the fact that a formal appli-
cation for use of community center facilities was required, and that such an
application could be (and was, in this case) rejected, was the court's interme-
diate conclusion in this case-that the community center was a designated
public forum, to which access had been granted on a general basis222 -
consistent with what Justice Kennedy said in Forbes? His assertion, again,
was this: "[T]he government does not create a designated public forum
when it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'ob-
tain permission,' to use it."' 223 Does that not describe the situation in Goulart,
or are we to correctly understand that there is no real permission requirement
when "permission" is "'granted as a matter of course"' (to some speakers, at
least) by the rules that govern the forum?
Two decisions involving access to public transit systems show even less
commitment to the Forbes permission factor as a potentially dispositive cri-
terion. In the first, Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania Transportation Authority (CBM),224 the transportation authority,
SEPTA, allowed paid advertising in its rail and subway stations, but rejected
an anti-abortion advertisement submitted by the challenger, CBM.22 5
220. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 250-51 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at255.
222. Id. at 251.
223. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (citation omit-
ted).
224. 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 244.
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SEPTA's written policy governing such advertising included the following
language:
All advertising displays shall be of an appropriate charac-
ter and quality, and the appearance of all displays shall be accepta-
ble to SEPTA. No libelous, slanderous, or obscene advertising
maybe [sic] accepted .... All advertising determined by ...
SEPTA, in its sole discretion, as objectionable.., must not be uti-
lized on any SEPTA vehicle or facility. SEPTA shall have the
right to immediately remove any advertising material which has al-
ready been applied, in the event that ... SEPTA deems material
objectionable for any reason ....226
Despite this evidence that SEPTA retained tight control over the forum, the
United States Court of Appeals rejected SEPTA's argument that no designat-
ed public forum had been created.2 7 In doing so, Judge Roth made the fol-
lowing striking assertions:
[T]he fact that SEPTA has reserved for itself the right to reject ads
for any reason at all does not signify, in and of itself alone, that no
public forum has been created. In [a prior decision], we warned
that "standards for inclusion and exclusion" in a limited public fo-
rum "must be unambiguous and definite" if the "concept of a des-
ignated open forum is to retain any vitality whatever." . .. [T]he
fact that the government has reserved the right to control speech
without any particular standards or goals, and without reference to
the purpose of the forum, does not necessarily mean that it has not
created a public forum.
22 8
Looking at SEPTA's past practice, the court found that SEPTA had "ac-
cepted a broad range of advertisements for display,' 229 including two adver-
tisements pertaining to the subject of abortion. 3 ° Judge Roth was thus led to
this result:
We conclude then, based on SEPTA's written policies, which
specifically provide for the exclusion of only a very narrow cate-
gory of ads, based on SEPTA's goals of generating revenues
through the sale of ad space, and based on SEPTA's practice of
226. Id. at 250-51.
227. Id. at 252.
228. Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
229. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251.
230. See id.
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permitting virtually unlimited access to the forum, that SEPTA
created a designated public forum.
231
SEPTA's argument based on its "'tight control' over the forum," and the fact
that its permission was required, was explicitly rejected, largely because "at
least 99% of all ads [were] posted without objection by SEPTA, ' '232 and those
few ads to which SEPTA had previously objected (resulting in their modifi-
cation) were objectionable for reasons unrelated to the content of CBM's
proposed advertisement.233 Strict scrutiny was thus called for, but the court
went on to hold that the rejection of CBM's advertisement could not even
withstand the test of reasonableness. 34
The second of these public-transit cases is United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority.35
The transit authority, SORTA, allowed paid advertising on its buses, and had
accepted an ad from the union, UFCW, but rejected a second such adver-
tisement submitted by UFCW.2 36 SORTA's advertising policy, according to
Judge Moore, "specifically excludes '[a]dvertising of controversial public
issues that may adversely affect SORTA's ability to attract and maintain
ridership,' and requires that all ads 'be aesthetically pleasing and enhance the
environment for SORTA's riders and customers and SORTA's standing in
the community."
237
UCFW's second advertisement, which essentially conveyed a pro-union
message, was rejected by SORTA's general manager-"who must approve
every wrap-around bus advertisement"-because he deemed it "aesthetically
unpleasant and controversial., 238 The union sued, the District Court entered
a preliminary injunction in its favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.239
In his opinion for the court, Judge Moore quoted the key pronounce-
ments from Justice Kennedy's Forbes opinion, but then proceeded, in es-
sence, to decline to be governed by them, saying this:
Discerning whether the government permits general access to
public property or limits access to a select few does not end our
inquiry, however, for we must also assess the nature of the forum
231. Id. at 252.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255-57.
235. 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998).
236. Id. at 346-47.
237. Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
238. Id. at 347.
239. Id. at 347, 364.
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and whether the excluded speech is compatible with the forum's
multiple purposes. The government's decision to limit access to
the property is not dispositive in answering whether or not the
government created a designated public forum. Rather, we must
also examine the relationship between the reasons for any restric-
tion on access and the forum's purpose. A contrary rule that fo-
cused solely on whether a speaker must obtain permission to
access government property "would allow every designated public
forum to be converted into a non-public forum the moment the
government did what is supposed to be impermissible in a desig-
nated public forum, which is to exclude speech based on con-
tent."
240
While the court's solicitude for freedom of expression is admirable, it is dif-
ficult to reconcile this language with the thrust of Forbes. Pursuant to a
proper understanding of the concept of the limited public forum, moreover, a
government actor is permitted to limit access to a designated public forum on
the basis of the content of speech.24 Judge Moore continued his lengthy
explication of these matters by positing that "the courts will infer an intent on
the part of the government to create a public forum where the government's
justification for the exclusion of certain expressive conduct is unrelated to
the forum's purpose, even when speakers must obtain permission to use the
forum. 242 But it is hard to understand why the government's justification
must be related, somehow, to "the forum's purpose," when the Supreme
Court has stated repeatedly that the key to the classification of a forum is the
government actor's intent.243 That perceived requirement, however, played a
major role in leading the court to the conclusion that a designated public fo-
rum had been created here, as the court-looking past SORTA's written pol-
icy to focus instead on its practices-found "no established causal link" be-
tween SORTA's stated goals "and its broad-based discretion to exclude ad-
vertisements that are too controversial or not aesthetically pleasing."2" The
court was willing to "assume that those seeking access to SORTA's advertis-
ing space must first obtain permission from SORTA, and that this permission
is not granted as a matter of course,"245 and yet still managed to conclude
"that in accepting a wide array of political and public-issue speech, SORTA
has demonstrated its intent to designate its advertising space a public fo-
240. United Food, 163 F.3d at 350-51 (citations omitted).
241. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
242. United Food, 163 F.3d at 351.
243. See id. at 350.
244. Id. at 354.
245. Id. at 353.
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rum.'2 46 As in the Christ's Bride Ministries case, the court went on to find
that the transit authority's action could survive neither strict scrutiny nor the
reasonableness test.247 Judge Wellford, concurring, agreed that the rejection
of the union's advertisement was unreasonable, but did not agree with the
conclusion that SORTA had created a designated public forum.
248
A variation on this theme, finally, is the situation in which it appears
that no formal permission is required, but a question remains as to whether or
not the government actor has retained sufficient control over access to the
forum to compel the conclusion that the forum is non-public. Such a case is
Hopper v. City of Pasco,249 in which the plaintiffs were two "artists whose
works were excluded from public display at the Pasco City Hall Gallery in
Pasco, Washington, because city officials deemed their art too 'controver-
sial."' 250 Local artists were invited to display their works in the public hall-
ways of a new city hall.251 While a notice inviting such submissions included
the statement that "all works will be screened for content and professional
presentation, ' 252 the Court of Appeals described the situation as follows:
[T]he arts program was run without any pre-screening process, and
the city provided no further definition or guidance as to what kind
of work would be considered inappropriate. There was no selec-
tion process to monitor quality, content, or controversy. As a re-
sult, the Arts Council rejected no artwork during the entire length
of the program .... Nor did the city review works prior to their
placement in the gallery.253
But the city manager "assumed the Arts Council, [which actually adminis-
tered the program] would screen for content," and the city manager's assis-
tant "testified that he expected and trusted [the director of the Arts Council]
to make sure that no 'offensive or politically-motivated art' would be
shown.' '2' As it turned out, one plaintiffs sculptures were removed from the
display, and the other plaintiff's prints were never displayed--despite having
been submitted for display-in both cases because of their potentially offen-
246. Id. at 355.
247. United Food, 163 F.3d at 355-58.
248. Id. at 364-65 (Wellford, J., concurring).
249. 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
250. Id. at 1069-70.
251. ld. at 1070.
252. Id. at 1071.
253. Id. at 1071-72.
254. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1072.
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sive content. 5 Had the city created a designated public forum? Despite the
written notice indicating that works would be "screened for content," and
despite the undeniable fact that an artist's work would not actually be exhi-
bited unless the Arts Council chose to display it, the Court (saying nothing
explicitly about "permission") held that a designated public forum had in-
deed been created, explaining its conclusion as follows:
It is undisputed that Pasco opened its display space to expressive
activity by retaining the Arts Council to manage a gallery with ex-
hibitions by local artists. This evinces an intent to create a desig-
nated public forum . . . . The city's so-called policy of non-
controversy became no policy at all because it was not consistently
enforced and because it lacked any definite standards. Prior to the
exclusion of the works at issue here, the city neither pre-screened
submitted works, nor exercised its asserted right to exclude works.
... Given the undisputed facts in the record concerning the selec-
tion and screening process for art to be displayed at City Hall (or
rather, the lack thereof), we conclude that the city retained no
substantive control over the content of the arts program. 25 6
"Having effectively opened its doors to all comers," the Court went on to
say, the city "has failed to exercise the clear and consistent control over the
exhibits in city hall" required to establish a non-public forum. 257 The Court
went on to find that the city could not satisfy the requisite strict judicial scru-
tiny.258 A dissenting judge, viewing summary judgment in favor of the chal-
lengers as inappropriate, did not believe that the record clearly established
that a designated public forum had been created. 59
At the lower-court level, then, it seems fair to conclude that Forbes has
not, through its emphasis on whether "permission" is needed, provided the
kind of bright-line test that it might have appeared to provide. Cases of the
kind which I have just described raise serious questions, moreover, as to
whether "permission" is an unambiguous, and therefore, workable, concept.
Is "permission" required, so that access to the forum should be viewed as
"selective" rather than "general," in every instance in which, due to physical-
ly limited resources (because, for example, there are a limited number of
buses or rooms in community centers available at any particular time) it is
necessary to employ a procedure whereby a speaker must make application
255. Id. at 1073.
256. Id. at 1078.
257. Id. at 1080.
258. Id. at 1081-82.
259. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1083-92 (Gould, J., dissenting).
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for access to the forum at issue? If so, should the fact that permission is
technically required lead to a "selective access" conclusion even if permis-
sion is always (or virtually always) granted? Should it matter, furthermore,
why access might be denied by the governmental gatekeeper, or does it suf-
fice that the system in place contemplates that access may sometimes be de-
nied?
b. Is "Standardless Discretion" Relevant?
As the preceding discussion reveals, courts have at times been influ-
enced in determining whether a designated public forum has been created, by
the perception that the relevant government actor has effectively been given
unlimited discretion to grant or deny access to the forum in question; the
existence of standardless discretion has, in those cases, been held against the
government. Thus, in the CBM case, the court reiterated the assertion of an
earlier Third Circuit panel that "'standards for inclusion and exclusion' in a
limited public forum 'must be unambiguous and definite' if the 'concept of a
designated [public] forum is to retain any vitality whatever,"260 and went on,
in the process of reaching the conclusion that a designated public forum had
been created, to observe that "[t]here is no policy, written or unwritten, pur-
suant to which CBM's ads were removed., 261 In the United Food & Com-
mercial Workers case, the court employed some of the language from the
CBM opinion to make the same point more explicitly.2 62 "[I]f the 'concept of
a designated open forum is to retain any vitality whatever,' we will hold that
the government did not create a public forum only when its standards for
inclusion and exclusion are clear and are designed to prevent interference
with the forum's designated purpose.2 63
In the Hopper case as well, the court quoted the heart of the statement
about standards made in the CBM opinion, adding, somewhat cryptically in
the midst of its discussion of the forum issue, that "[c]ourts have also been
reluctant to accept policies based on subjective or overly general criteria.' '264
The theme was echoed in the court's later statement that "[t]he city's so-
called policy of non-controversy [with regard to the display of art at city hall]
became no policy at all because it was not consistently enforced and because
260. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1365, 1375 (3d Cir. 1990)).
261. Id. at 254.
262. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.,
163 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir. 1998).
263. Id.
264. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2001).
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it lacked any definite standards. 265 Still later in its discussion of the forum
issue, the court said this:
[D]espite its stated policy of avoiding "controversial art," Pasco
never established criteria by which to assess whether or not a work
would fall within the policy. Instead, application . . . was left en-
tirely to the discretion of city administrators.
The potential for abuse of such unbounded discretion is heigh-
tened by the inherently subjective nature of the standard itself. A
ban on "controversial art" may all too easily lend itself to view-
point discrimination, a practice forbidden even in limited public
fora.2
66
The court's conclusion, with respect to the classification of the forum, was,
again, that "[h]aving effectively opened its doors to all comers, subject only
[to] a standardless standard," the city had failed in its attempt to persuade the
court that the art exhibit was a non-public forum.26 7 The existence of stan-
dardless discretion thus clearly seemed to bother the court and bolster its
conclusion that a designated public forum had been created.
But the question must be asked: Why must the gatekeeper of a go-
vernmental forum be limited by definite standards, in the exercise of discre-
tion regarding access to that forum, in order for the forum to be deemed non-
public? Indeed, what does the issue of standardless discretion have to do
with the ostensibly governing criterion of the government's intent to create,
or not to create, an open forum? Forbes itself appears to contradict such
reasoning, as reflected in the complaint of Justice Stevens, in his dissenting
opinion, that "the Court barely mentions the standardless character of the
decision to exclude Forbes from the debate.
2 68
It bears mentioning that the issue of standardless discretion has come
into play in yet another way in some lower-court decisions involving public
forum determinations-namely, as a basis for finding forbidden viewpoint
discrimination. The link between standardless discretion and the potential
265. Id. at 1078.
266. Id. at 1079.
267. Id. at 1080. What the court actually said at this point was that "Pasco has failed to
exercise the clear and consistent control over the exhibits in city hall that our cases require to
maintain a limited public forum." Id. But it must be understood that, in the Ninth Circuit, the
"limited" public forum has been consistently equated with the "non-public" forum. See supra
text accompanying notes 180-84.
268. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666, 684 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He went on to deplore the "arbitrary definitions of the scope of the forum," and
AETC's "entirely subjective, ad hoc judgments about the dimensions of [the] forum." Id. at
690.
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for impermissible viewpoint discrimination is well-established, as Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co.269 makes clear:
[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish
... between a licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegi-
timate abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the guideposts
that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to de-
termine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored
speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the
licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are
far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any par-
ticular case whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and sup-
270pressing unfavorable, expression.
The danger of content and viewpoint censorship, he went on to say, "is at its
zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to
the unbridled discretion of a government official. 27'
According to some federal appellate courts, standardless discretion does
not simply create a danger of viewpoint discrimination, but, in essence,
amounts to such discrimination, serving as a basis for invalidating a regulato-
ry scheme even in a non-public forum. 272 Thus, in the words of one court,
"viewpoint neutrality requires not just that a government refrain from expli-
cit viewpoint discrimination, but also that it provide adequate safeguards to
protect against the improper exclusion of viewpoints. 273 But it is the exer-
cise of viewpoint discrimination-as opposed to simply the potential there-
fore-that, according to the Supreme Court, will invalidate a denial of access
to a non-public forum. As one court has observed, moreover, "[a]ll of the
modem cases in which the Supreme Court has set forth the unbridled discre-
tion doctrine have involved public fora, and no Supreme Court case has sug-
gested that the doctrine is applicable outside the setting of a public forum.
2 74
Thus, while judicial wariness of standardless discretion even in non-public
fora is commendable, the willingness of some courts to equate such discre-
269. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
270. Id. at 758.
271. Id. at763.
272. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062,
1069 (4th Cir. 2006); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1007-09 (10th Cir. 2002);
Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2001). See also DeBoer v. Vill. of
Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 572-74 (7th Cir. 2001).
273. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 457
F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).
274. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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tion with viewpoint discrimination must be regarded as highly questionable
under prevailing legal doctrine.
IV. CAN A MEANINGFUL "LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM" CATEGORY EXIST?
While lower courts have discerned the existence of designated and li-
mited public fora more frequently than pessimistic readers of pertinent Su-
preme Court opinions would ever have expected, the questionable nature of
some of these rulings, combined with the intrinsic challenge of finding a
limited forum to be open to a challenger while faithfully employing a "gov-
ernment intent" standard, cannot help but leave one wondering, still, whether
a meaningful and workable "limited public forum" concept can be envi-
sioned. In asking this question, one may benefit by briefly considering, first,
whether the overall public forum doctrine makes sense, and, next, whether
the "permission" factor highlighted in Forbes offers a persuasive basis for
distinguishing between closed and open fora.
A. Rationalizing the Public Forum Doctrine
Arguably, the public forum doctrine, overall, does make sense. As an
overall body of rules, its primary effect is to presumptively make many go-
vernmentally-controlled properties and channels of communication "off lim-
its" to expressive activities by ordinary citizens. In each such case, the gov-
ernment, as the proprietor of property not traditionally or primarily dedicated
to speech or assembly, has made the judgment that such expressive activity is
not compatible with the intended use of the property. While judicial defe-
rence to the government's judgment in this regard is not inevitable, a signifi-
cant degree thereof is arguably defensible.275 Meanwhile, traditional public
fora, as well as private property and privately-controlled channels of com-
munication, remain presumptively accessible to speakers. We are accus-
tomed to "place" limitations on speakers (subject, of course, to intermediate
judicial scrutiny, because the restrictions are content-neutral), but the public
forum doctrine is special in that it allows even content-based distinctions to
be made, in a non-public forum, on the basis of "place" considerations. Even
those critics who have urged the Court to employ an approach that approx-
imates a "compatibility" analysis in such cases,276 however, would counten-
ance content discrimination that could not withstand strict scrutiny.
275. See the discussion of warranted judicial deference to governmental exercise of "ma-
nagerial authority" in Post, supra note 4, at 1809-24.
276. See, e.g., Post, supra note 4, at 1765-66. Similarly, Professor Gey has argued for the
use of what he calls an "interference" analysis that asks "whether expressive activity would
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The governmental property thus made "off limits" to speech is, moreo-
ver, made only presumptively unavailable to speakers, as meaningful judicial
review is employed even with respect to non-public fora, in which restric-
tions must satisfy a requirement of "reasonableness." To a surprising extent,
lower courts have put teeth into this seemingly deferential standard, not in-
frequently striking down denials of access to non-public fora as unreasona-
ble.277 More importantly, the doctrine in fact encompasses significant limita-
tions on discrimination; viewpoint discrimination is forbidden in all set-
tings, 278 and content discrimination is presumptively impermissible not only
in traditional public fora, but also in any non-traditional forum which a gov-
ernment actor has decided to treat as if it were a traditional public forum. 2 79
Under the proper understanding of the limited public forum concept, moreo-
ver, content discrimination is presumptively intolerable within the class of
speakers to whom the forum has been opened. Thus, the doctrine, in its enti-
rety, can be seen as balancing deference toward the government as proprietor
with an insistence that, at some point, discrimination among speakers is un-
acceptable.28 ° Of course, the nondiscrimination principle is undermined, in
tend to interfere in a significant way with the government's own activities in [a] forum." Gey,
supra note 4, at 1576. Professors Farber and Nowak, meanwhile, argued for a "focused ba-
lancing" approach. Farber & Nowak, supra note 4, at 1239-45.
277. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 972 (9th Cir. 2008); Initia-
tive & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hu-
minski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2005); Sammartano v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.,
303 F.3d 959, 966-70 (9th Cir. 2002); Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 271 F.3d 198, 203-
04 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted en banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002); Kincaid v. Gibson,
236 F.3d 342, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2001); United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v.
Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 357-58 (6th Cir. 1998); Christ's Bride Minis-
tries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255-57 (3d Cir. 1998).
278. Findings of viewpoint discrimination by lower courts are also not uncommon. See,
e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc., 515 F.3d at 972; Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir.
2007) (note the court's confusion regarding the governing rules, at 124-25). See also Ridley
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 89 (1st Cir. 2004); Child Evangelism Fellowship of
N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 527-30 (3d Cir. 2004); Giebel v. Sylve-
ster, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001); see also cases cited supra notes 272 & 273.
279. 'The role of categorical analysis in public forum jurisprudence is to generalize about
the kinds of places where denials of access tend systematically to trigger well-founded con-
cerns about deliberate governmental abuse and distortion." BeVier, supra note 4, at 121.
280. Professor BeVier has argued that the designated public forum concept serves the
objective of preventing viewpoint discrimination:
The designated public forum category serves this purpose by calling on government to justify
selective exclusions from property that it has deliberately opened to expressive activity. When
the government itself intentionally designates public property as a forum, it announces its own
judgment that speech is compatible with the property's other uses. Thus, a policy of selective
exclusion would be presumptively suspect as the product, not of a legitimate concern with dis-
ruption, but of an illicit concern with the speaker's viewpoint.
BeVier, supra note 4, at 109.
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large part, by the fact that the government is not required to maintain the
openness of a designated public forum,2"' and may limit access to the forum
by speech content or speaker identity.
B. Does the "Permission" Factor Make Sense?
The Court's recognition of a "permission" requirement as the hallmark
of "selective access," thereby indicating that a forum is "non-public" rather
than "designated" (or "limited"), surely fits nicely into a regime that is de-
voted, above all else, to effectuating the intent of the relevant government
actor. The existence of a "gatekeeper," who grants access to some but denies
it to others, can be seen as a clear indication of an intent to keep a forum
closed. But when the gatekeeper allows some to enter, one could just as
easily conclude that the forum is "limited," meaning that it is open to some
and closed to others. A "permission" requirement, in other words, is not
inescapably an indicator of an intent to maintain a closed forum. One may
yet be grateful to Justice Kennedy for his identification of a relatively con-
crete criterion by which courts are to be guided, in what would otherwise be
a largely unstructured process of divining governmental intent. At the same
time, it must be recognized that this is a criterion that can only have the ef-
fect of reducing the number of instances in which an "open" forum will be
found to exist-particularly if every situation in which access to a forum is
granted pursuant to a formal application process (as was true even in Widmar
itself!) is viewed as one in which "permission" is required, regardless of how
often access is denied.
In Forbes, Kennedy defended the Court's "distinction between general
and selective access [as one that] furthers First Amendment interests. 282 By
not equating selective access with a governmental intent to open a forum, he
explained, "we encourage the government to open its property to some ex-
pressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it
might not open the property at all. ' 283 The logic of that suggestion is clear, in
the abstract, but is it likely to prove accurate, in reality? Is it not more likely
that governmental entities, advised by counsel that they will enjoy more lati-
tude with respect to "forum" determinations if they implement meaningful
"permission" requirements so as to grant only "selective" access, will do just
281. Indeed, one commentator has argued, not unreasonably, "that within the parameters
of a limited public forum, it is impossible to differentiate between an impermissible content-
based . . . restriction on speech and a valid subject-matter-based or speaker-based re-
designation of the forum." McGill, supra note 4, at 939.
282. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998).
283. Id.
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that? Would not a city that wished to invite local artists to submit their
works for display at city hall, for example (as in the Hopper case, discussed
above), 4 likely employ a regime pursuant to which every submission would
be screened on the basis of content?
85
C. Can the "Limited Public Forum" Be Salvaged?
The difficulties attending the concept of the limited public forum, even
when that concept is properly understood, are clear. While Justice Black-
mun's complaint that the category had effectively been eliminated may have
been overstated, the fact remains that instances of governmental fora opened
to certain categories of speaker, in which the excluded speaker is seen as
falling within the class to whom the forum was intended to be opened, are
likely to be rare. Even when a court is prepared to conclude that "general
access" to a forum has been extended to a class of speakers, that decision
will likely lead to a second difficult determination as to whom it has been
opened-i.e., how shall the favored class be defined? In Widmar, the Court
found that the university classrooms had been made available to registered
student organizations, but why did the Court not conclude that the facilities
had been opened only to non-religious student organizations? In Forbes, the
Court found that the televised debate had been opened to serious Congres-
sional candidates, but why did the Court not conclude that it had been
opened to all Congressional candidates?
The challenge of defining the forum is nicely illustrated by an exchange
between Justices Breyer and Kennedy, in dictum, in a 1996 decision, Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission.286 Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Breyer had oc-
casion to offer the following comment:
284. See supra text accompanying notes 248-58.
285. See PETA, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the exercise
of tight governmental control over the selection of sculptures to be featured in a public art
project-and the rejection of one of plaintiff's designs-was upheld as an exercise of "gov-
ernment speech;" forum analysis was deemed wholly inapplicable in this context. A similar
ruling, in the context of specialty license plate programs, is ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). But compare Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
963-68 (9th Cir. 2008), and Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir.
2004). See also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). For a dis-
cussion of the relationship of "government speech" to forum analysis, see generally Dolan,
supra note 171.
286. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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[I]t is plain from this Court's cases that a public forum "may be
created for a limited purpose." Our cases have not yet determined,
however, that [the] [G]overmnent's decision to dedicate a public
forum to one type of content or another is necessarily subject to
the highest level of scrutiny. Must a local government, for exam-
ple, show a compelling state interest if it builds a band shell in the
park and dedicates it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)?
The answer is not obvious.
287
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Ginsburg), in a separate opinion, re-
sponded to Breyer as follows:
I do not foreclose the possibility that the Government could
create a forum limited to certain topics or to serving the special
needs of certain speakers or audiences without its actions being
subject to strict scrutiny. This possibility seems to trouble the plu-
rality, which wonders if a local government must "show a compel-
ling state interest if it builds a band shell in the park and dedicates
it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)." . . . This is not the
correct analogy. [Our case is] more akin to the Government's cre-
ation of a band shell in which all types of music might be per-
formed except for rap music.28
s
Were a case to arise, then, in which a governmental band shell was made
available only to musicians playing classical music, and a challenge was
brought by an excluded jazz musician, how should the forum (assuming the
challenger could even surmount the hurdle of persuading the court that it was
a limited as opposed to a non-public forum) be described? Would it be open
to all musicians, or open only to classical musicians? If the latter, then the
"open" character of the forum would be of no avail to the excluded jazzman.
Perhaps the key to salvaging a meaningful limited-public-forum catego-
ry is to employ two distinctions, in those cases in which the forum has clear-
ly been opened to some speakers: a distinction between speaker identity and
speech content, and a distinction between a government actor's "primary"
and "secondary" intentions. The first of these distinctions is predicated on
the fact that, while the limited public forum was initially defined as one
"created for a limited purpose such as use by [different] groups... or for the
discussion of certain subjects, 289 there is a difference between discrimina-
287. Id. at 749-50 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 n.7 (1983)) (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (1983).
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tion on the basis of speaker identity and discrimination based on the content
of speech. Coupling that distinction with a determination of "primary" and
"secondary" intentions, while far from a fully comfortable approach, may
just be the only way to escape from the intrinsic tautology of dividing the
open or closed nature of a forum based on an assessment of governmental
intent.
The suggested approach would work as follows: When a court is per-
suaded that the primary intention of the relevant government actor is to make
a forum available to a particular category of speakers, defined without refer-
ence to the content of their speech, and that a secondary intention is to block
access to a member of the favored category based upon the content of his
speech, the forum should be deemed a limited public forum and the content-
based restriction should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Thus, Widmar may
be understood as implicitly based upon the understanding that the universi-
ty's primary intention was to make its facilities available to student organiza-
tions, to which was added a less important, secondary intention to bar student
organizations engaging in religious speech; the distinction based on speaker
identity (student organizations versus the rest of the world) reflected the uni-
versity's dominant intention. In contrast, Lehman and Greer, to take just two
additional examples from Supreme Court cases, were each situations in
which the primary intention of the relevant government actor was to bar
speech of a certain content (political campaign advertising and political cam-
paign speech, respectively), regardless of speaker identity. Compare Perry,
in which the school district's primary intention was to discriminate based on
speaker identity (in favor of the certified bargaining representative) rather
than speech content, but the excluded speaker did not fall within the favored
class of speakers. Focusing on these distinctions may, just possibly, provide
a principled basis for requiring access by speakers to limited public fora.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
More than ten years have passed since the Supreme Court last de-
cided-in Forbes-whether a governmentally controlled channel of commu-
nication was or was not an open forum for expression. The Court has, in that
span of time, declined on several occasions to hear cases that would provide
it with the opportunity to do so again,29 despite the undeniable existence of
290. See, e.g., Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1043 (2004); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 8, 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1149 (2004); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196
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conflict within the federal courts of appeals concerning the proper under-
standing and treatment of the "middle category" of governmental fora.29" '
Meanwhile, the mystery of the legal significance of that middle category-
and, in particular, the limited public forum-persists, along with the steady
flow of cases which require, for their resolution, a decision as to whether or
not the forum in question has been opened for expressive purposes. The
uncertainty surrounding this body of First Amendment doctrine cries out for
resolution.
Therefore, your humble author beseeches the Court to grant certiorari,
soon, in a case that will afford it the opportunity to clarify the following
points: When does a limited public forum exist? What is the legal signific-
ance of that designation? If, as Forbes suggests, the need for speakers to
obtain "permission" as a condition of access to a forum is the key to the dis-
tinction between "general access" (in which the case the forum is a "desig-
nated" public forum of some kind) and "selective access" (in which case the
forum is "non-public," or closed), what does it mean to say that "permission"
is required? What is the relevance (if any), for this analysis, of a grant of
standardless discretion to the relevant government actor? If, finally, the exis-
tence of a limited public forum is ever to support a claim of access by a
speaker who has been excluded by the relevant government actor, how is a
court to decide-once it decides that the forum has been opened to some
speakers-how to identify the class of speakers to whom it has been opened?
To the extent that these questions can be answered in a way that maximizes
opportunities for expression in governmentally-controlled fora, the clarifica-
tion of doctrine prayed for herein will be even more welcome. But, above
all, give us clarity, please.
F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1067 (2000); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999).
291. The persistent denial of certiorari in cases of this kind is particularly striking in light
of the fact that Chief Justice Roberts (speaking in May 2007) reportedly offered, as one expla-
nation for the Court's smaller docket in recent years, "fewer conflicts among the circuits."
Marcia Coyle, Justices' Homestretch Packed, 29 NAT'L L.J., June 4, 2007 at 17.
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